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Abstract 
Jesus Christ’s Commandment to Love one’s neighbour as one’s self in Mark 12:28-31 
plays a pivotal role in the social moral doctrine of nineteenth century philosopher John Stuart 
Mill’s Utilitarianism and of twentieth century philosopher Pope John Paul II’s Love and 
Responsibility.  The difference between their respective interpretations is in each man’s 
definition of love.  Believing the human drive to obtain pleasure and to mitigate pain to be the 
moral arbiter of all consequence, Mill equates Christ’s definition of love with utilitarian notions 
of pleasure, utility, and happiness.  In response to such claims, and with a specific focus on how 
this mentality negatively affects marriage and family, John Paul II primarily argues that love 
does not necessarily beget pleasure, utility, happiness, or pain’s mitigation, and that true love is 
not a feeling but an action, whereby one prizes another’s innate dignity above such things. 
Mill’s moral order is rooted in happiness – an inherently personal, subjective, and 
therefore inconstant moral standard; social harmony is achieved by protecting and adding to 
one’s own happiness and to the happiness of others, and by ensuring society’s freedom from 
unhappiness.  Conversely, JPII first subordinates concerns for personal happiness to God, in 
accordance with Chris’s first Commandment, and thereby to the objective, unchanging and 
therefore constant nature of the human person.  Social harmony is achieved by mirroring Christ’s 
example of subtracting from his own life to serve others; thus, pleasure may be foregone and 
pain experienced in the interest of upholding human dignity and refraining from mere use of 
others.  These differences are rooted in Mill’s agnostic view that earthly happiness is life’s 
primary purpose, and in JPII’s Christian view that life’s purpose is love through self-giving to 
the point of suffering, which in turn results in eternal joy through, with, and in God.   
Despite these differences, both agree that serving others must be life’s primary aim.   
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J.S. Mill and John Paul II: Utilitarianism and Loving Your Neighbour 
 
One of the scribes, when he came forward and heard them disputing and saw how 
well he had answered them, asked him, “Which is the first of all the 
commandments?”  Jesus replied, “The first is this: ‘Hear, O Israel!  The Lord our 
God is Lord alone!  You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all 
your soul, with all your mind, and with all your strength.’  The second is this: ‘You 




1: Utilitarians and Christians Define Love Differently 
All people – regardless of the ethical doctrine to which they subscribe, regardless of the 
‘selfless’ principles which they claim to uphold – ultimately form their moral doctrine to justify 
acting to experience the greatest amount of pleasure, and the least amount of pain.1  As morally 
repugnant to some as this statement may have seemed, John Stuart Mill, revered agnostic, 
utilitarian philosopher, economist, and civil rights activist of nineteenth century Britain, 
championed this belief as the basis for his 1861 treatise in support of the philosophical doctrine, 
utilitarianism.2  Ninety-nine years after its publication, this same claim was largely reaffirmed by 
young Polish Catholic bishop, Karol Wojtyła, in his critique of utilitarianism, found within his 
larger theological work on spousal love, marriage, family, and marital/sexual intimacy, Love and 
Responsibility – “utilitarianism is a characteristic property of contemporary man’s mentality and 
his attitude toward life. … utilitarianism constitutes a perennial bedrock, as it were, on which the 
life of individuals and human collectives tends to flow”.3  This same bishop, who affirmed Mill’s 
insight on this subject, would later become Pope John Paul II (whom henceforth shall be 
referenced as JPII).4 
One might assume that philosophers of decidedly different religious persuasions would 
have different views on this subject.  While these crucial similarities exist, however, they are 
irrevocably demarcated by each philosopher’s entirely separate understanding of Jesus Christ’s 
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Second Greatest Commandment, which JPII identifies as the Biblical Commandment to Love –
“[t]he commandment formulated in the Gospel demands from man love for other people, for 
neighbours (bliźni)”, and which Mill identifies as “…the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, … [t]o 
do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself…”.5 
In Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill describes the end of utilitarianism as the greatest 
pleasure and the least pain for the greatest number, conditional on the Biblical Commandment to 
Love.  To utilitarianism’s detractors Mill states that honest self-reflection will reveal personal 
happiness as the basic motive for human conduct – proof that utilitarianism holds “the 
fundamental principle of morality, and the source of moral obligation”.6  Mill argues that a social 
education in utilitarianism will harmonize public interest, ideally leading to universal happiness.7   
Pope John Paul II responds that utilitarianism and the Biblical Commandment to Love 
are incompatible, primarily because Mill does not acknowledge the necessity of God in the 
Commandment’s proper and effective application – “in its full reading, however, [the 
Commandment] demands love for persons.  For God, whom the commandment to love names in 
the first place, is the most perfect personal being.”8  While he acknowledges that utilitarian 
“mentalit[ies] and attitude[s … constitute] a perennial bedrock” of human life, he warns that the 
utilitarian outlook corrupts and divides society’s core – that is, marriages and families – causing 
self-giving love between spouses to disintegrate into (mutual) use and consumerism – the like of 
which is not natural, but a fateful consequence of Adam and Eve’s fall from grace, as detailed in 
Genesis.9  He argues that for the proper function of marriage and family – this microcosmic 
expression of society – pleasure, utility, must be viewed as “something collateral, accidental”.10  
In the context of marital love, therefore, pleasure and utility must, above all, be fully justified by 
self-giving love, that is, spousal love, a love only achieved by honouring the First 
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Commandment of Christianity – that is, to love God with all thyself, and subsequently, to love 
thy neighbour as thyself.11 This approach creates greater peace on earth, thereby cultivating 
greater earthly (and heavenly) social cohesion.12 
Thus, Mill and JPII agree that pleasure is a good.  Mill, however, accepts and champions 
this insight as the founding principle of morality.  To justify his position, he tailors certain 
Christian teachings to suit his agnostic utilitarian doctrine, viewing each as complementary.13  
On the other hand, JPII tempers this insight with Christian teaching manifest in the First 
Commandment, and ultimately views utilitarianism and Christianity as incompatible doctrines.14  
Therefore, what appear as complementary philosophies to a utilitarian appear as contradictory to 
a Christian-Catholic.  Here, therefore, are two separate interpretations of Christian teaching on 
pleasure. 
The purpose of this essay is twofold.  The first is to serve as a short accompaniment to 
both Utilitarianism and to JPII’s critique of the utilitarian doctrine, found in Love and 
Responsibility, with a particular focus on “Chapter I: The Person and the Drive: Part One: 
Analysis of the Verb ‘to use’”. Large portions of this essay are dedicated to quoting, 
summarizing, and paraphrasing portions of each text so that the principles of Utilitarianism and 
Love & Responsibility might be compared side by side.  Extracts have been simplified to achieve 
one of this paper’s primary goals – to render Mill and JPII’s work more accessible to 21st 
century Western readers and to younger audiences. 
The second purpose is to examine each philosopher’s interpretation of the Biblical 
Commandment to Love, and to help readers better understand how each philosopher views 
pleasure and its purpose.  Because Christianity, the Commandment to Love, pleasure, and, most 
importantly, creating a stable, well-functioning society based on the highest moral virtue are 
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topics critical to each philosophy, the term eden, which etymologically translates to “fertile 
pleasure park”, will be used intermittently as a suitable allegory through which to examine each 
philosophy – for on a fundamental level, each philosopher proposes what they believe to be the 
best means of achieving an Edenic society.15  Through Mill’s utilitarian-Christian lens, and 
through close examination of Utilitarianism, it would appear that, for Mill, Eden is ultimately 
achieved by focusing on one’s self – maximization of one’s personal experience of pleasure, 
minimization of one’s personal experience of pain.  Through JPII’s Christian lens, Eden is 
achievable by first focusing on honouring God, which subsequently leads to honouring others – 
maximizing love, selfless giving, and community – not to ensure greater pleasure or less pain, 
but to ensure that the dignity of all is honoured and affirmed. 
Hence, this paper expands on and extrapolates from JPII’s work, as seen in Chapter I, 
Part One of Love and Responsibility – that is, to understand the Commandment to Love from a 
Christian perspective, and to examine how a Christian would perceive a Mill-utilitarian’s 
understanding of the Commandment.16  This essay also seeks to examine Mill’s Utilitarianism 
from a utilitarian’s perspective, and how someone of Mill’s persuasion would perceive a 
Christian view of the Commandment. 
To further narrow our focus, this paper accepts JPII’s belief that society is only as strong 
as its smallest units, that is, marriage and family.17  Thus, generally, each philosophy will be 
applied and examined in the context of practical marital and familial circumstances.  Through 
this lens, this paper asserts that the aim of each philosophy is to ensure that marriages and 
families are properly equipped to work toward an Edenic state of happiness.  
From these insights proceed the arguments of this paper. 
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The thesis – on matters of first principles, Mill and JII share some crucial insights; to the 
untrained eye, these may be perceived as synonymous.  Each philosopher sees the value of 
pleasure, of utility, of happiness.  Even JPII openly acknowledges that use, which is often framed 
in opposition to Christian love, is an unavoidable factor in (married) love.  The key differential 
lies in each philosopher’s interpretation of the Commandment to Love.   
Part 2 offers five opening statements.  Firstly, despite differences in era and disciplinary 
background, both philosophers share the view that human beings are inclined toward 
utilitarianism.  Secondly, JPII’s critique of utilitarianism applies mainly to hedonistic 
utilitarianism, but also to the incongruous nature of hedonistic and personalistic utilitarianism, 
which Mill champions.  Thirdly, regarding first principles, according to Mill, all action and 
therefore all morality is oriented toward the Greatest Happiness Principle.  In contrast, according 
to JPII, in human relationships, all are called to subordinate a desire for pleasure and for pain’s 
mitigation to the protection of each person’s inalienable dignity.18  From this conclusion, one can 
assert that, fourthly, each philosopher conceives of the mind’s limits differently.  For Mill, 
people cannot reason beyond considerations for pleasure and pain; for JPII, people can reason 
beyond these considerations and can prioritize human dignity. 
Fifthly, both Mill and JPII believe that humans are geared toward social communion, but 
each hold different views on how humans should achieve social communion.  While Mill 
explains what people should do with this inclination, JPII explains the source from which this 
inclination stems; in accounting for this source, JPII then addresses the ‘what’.  Sixth and finally, 
Mill strongly rebukes the moral elasticity of Kant’s first principle, as expressed in his 
Metaphysics of Ethics, whereas JPII strongly values the moral rightness of Kant’s elementary 
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principle, as expressed in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.19  Each use their 
respective interpretations of Kant’s primary principle to prove and or build their philosophies.  
Parts 3 and 5 explore each philosopher’s view and or interpretation of pleasure, utility, 
human dignity, and the Commandment to Love.  On the one hand, Mill equates love with 
pleasure.  For Mill, the ‘Commandment to Love’ translates to the ‘Commandment to Pleasure’.  
To achieve an Edenic society, one must ensure that the greatest number of people secure the 
greatest amount of life’s pleasure.  In marriage, therefore, and in marital intimacy, one’s focus 
must be to maximize personal pleasure, and, more importantly, one’s spouse’s pleasure.  Selfless 
acts are fundamentally motivated by fear of pain and harm.  On the other hand, JPII states that 
love and pleasure are entirely separate realities.  For JPII (and indeed, for the Church), the 
Commandment to Love is the Commandment to Self-Sacrifice.  To achieve Eden, one must 
affirm the innate dignity and worth of each human person.  This experience may involve a great 
amount of pleasure – and or pain – for the doer and receiver of the (potential) action.  In 
marriage, therefore, specifically in marital intimacy, the aim is to affirm one’s spouse’s dignity 
and worth by focusing on the person, not the accompanying feelings.  Truly selfless acts are 
fundamentally motivated by a desire to serve and sacrifice for others by honouring others’ 
innate, God-imaging dignity.  This act in turn honours God, and therefore fulfills the call of 
Christianity’s First Commandment. 
Part 4 examines the objective and subjective structures supporting each moral order.  On 
the one hand, Mill offers an objective moral order rooted in the subjective standard of personal 
happiness.  What a person is inclined toward achieving, that is, pleasure, freedom from pain, 
determines who the human person is and what the moral standard is, which in turn determines 
what a human person should do.  On the other hand, JPII offers an objective moral order rooted 
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in objectivity (rooted in the human person’s unique, unrepeatable, distinct, rational identity, 
possessing free will, and endowed with self-determination).  Therefore, who a human person is 
defines what they should do and how they should interact with others.  Mill considers the 
objective-subjective nature of his philosophy to be a strength, for subjective standards ensure that 
a person’s personal liberty is justly respected.  JPII considers the objective-objective nature of 
his philosophy to be a strength, for it ensures consistent respect for all people’s innate and equal 
dignity.  Mill believes that objective-objective standards, that is, constant standards, general 
propositions and axiomatic truths as he calls them, lead to false conclusions and society’s 
disintegration; on the other hand, JPII believes that objective-subjective standards, that is, 
inconstant standards of that which constitutes pleasure and pain corrupted by fallen human 
nature, lead to false conclusions and harm of the human person.20 
Part 6 examines the basic ‘mathematical’ and ‘economic’ principles undergirding each 
philosopher’s view of the Commandment and of pleasure.  The first of two arguments – the 
constant value in Mill’s equation is ‘experience’ – that is, an experience of pleasure or of pain.  
Given that no two experiences are alike, Mill’s ‘constant’ is, by nature, inconstant.  The constant 
value in JPII’s ‘equation’ is the innate dignity of the human person, which is not situationally 
dependent or subject to change, but ever-present.  Therefore, JPII’s constant value is, by nature, 
constant.  The second of two arguments – Mill’s focus is addition, that is, adding to personal 
pleasures by giving of one’s life, which in turn leads to happiness.  On the other hand, JPII’s 
focus is subtraction – giving of oneself, losing one’s life, not because it is pleasurable but 
because others should have their dignity affirmed regardless of the pleasure or pain involved; the 
(personal) fulfilment resulting thereof must be considered collateral and not made the purpose of 
a person’s choice to behave benevolently.  Despite the usual positive connotations associated 
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with constancy and addition, and despite the usual negative connotations associated with 
inconstancy and subtraction, each philosopher considers their own philosophy’s ‘mathematical’ 
foundation to be a strength, a positive life-force, in their philosophical ‘equation’. 
Part 7 examines some extra-textual views of each philosopher to provide added insight 
into their core principles.  On the one hand, Mill holds that happiness must be found by the 
way.21  Practically speaking, this requires that one make it their ideal end to make others happy 
(as opposed to oneself), the consequence of which is one’s own personal happiness.  The Mill-
utilitarian goal, therefore, is not personal happiness – rather, it is to ensure others’ happiness; in 
living for others’ fulfillment, so too is one’s own happiness assured.  Similarly, JPII holds that 
people are both made and rightly thirst for happiness, but that true happiness comes from 
suffering for the sake of another, forgoing concerns for one’s own pleasure and mitigation of 
pain to strengthen relationships, create new life, allow others to determine their own ends, and to 
affirm another’s dignity.22  Therefore, the ideal end is the human person, not personal happiness, 
nor necessarily the happiness of others.  This principle is rooted in Christ’s invitation to his 
followers to take up their Cross, to accept and to bear the sufferings to which he calls each 
individually, and to follow him through to the resurrection, which in turn leads to eternal union 
with of God; through the Cross, through dying to selfishness and committing to give, humanity is 
reunified with its final end, the Creator.23  Thus, JPII holds that God is Love, and that spousal 
love is an eternal act of self-gift imaged in marriage and family.  Continuing Christ’s mission to 
spread peace in this way is the world’s best chance at achieving greater social harmony.24 
Finally, Part 8, which examines each philosophy’s conception of the supernatural, argues 
that the degree to which one values one philosophy over another is dependent on their belief in 
the existence of the Christian God.  On the one hand, Mill seeks to achieve the greatest amount 
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of social unity on earth as possible.  Given his agnosticism and his appreciation for some 
Christian principles, he is skeptical of God’s existence and of heaven’s.  He believes it possible 
to appropriate religious values, to apply them effectively, without ‘God’ and without ‘grace’, 
each of which, to Christians, are required without question for genuine application of the 
Commandment.  On the other hand, JPII echoes Christ’s call to “store up treasures in heaven” 
rather than on earth because he is certain of both God’s and heaven’s existence – he therefore 
teaches the value of forsaking mere inclination toward the utilitarian mentality.25  At the heart of 
JPII’s philosophy, therefore, is firm belief in God and in Catholic-Christian teaching, for God 
and love are synonymous.  To love one’s neighbour is to “God one’s neighbour”, therefore, God 
is inseparable from the Commandment to Love.  The Second Commandment cannot exist or 
occur without the First. 
There are two practical reasons for investing time in reading this paper.  Firstly –
utilitarianism and Christianity are philosophies fundamental to Western thought.  Each bear great 
relevance in an age where, generally speaking, Christian values, beliefs, attitudes, and 
terminology either slip into the subtext of cultural and social morality, or are subsumed in the 
undercurrent of a utilitarian mentality, reinterpreted through secular lenses, and lose their 
original Christian resonance.  While a Westerner may believe that they are applying a somewhat 
‘universal’ and objectively true definition of love to their spousal and familial relationships, they 
are likely applying either a utilitarian mindset or a Christian mindset – not a melding of the two, 
as Mill proposes, but actually two entirely separate understandings of Christian teaching – hence 
mass marital breakdown.26 
Secondly – few scholars have written extensively on Mill’s Utilitarianism in specific 
relation to JPII’s Love and Responsibility with this particular topic in mind.  This is unfortunate 
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because the coexistence of these two contrasting, if not opposing, philosophies cause great social 
tension.  Many a Christian or utilitarian-Christian believe that they are working toward the same 
goal under a similar doctrinal domain, when in truth, they are working toward opposite goals, 
driven by separate motivations.  These misconceptions and miscommunications are, of course, 
silent, lethal impediments to both understanding and agreeing on a range of important subjects of 
moral and ethical debate.  It is critical that subscribers to each philosophy understand the moral 
implications of applying the fundamental principles one philosophical mindset over the other – 
for as each philosopher attests, there are hugely positive or hugely negative social ramifications 
for misunderstanding, misapplying, and or discounting either philosophy.  Thus, for the good of 
society, this problem necessitates further examination and social education.  
Generally, this essay begins by introducing insights from Mill’s Utilitarianism in a 
similar order to their original presentation and follows with counterarguments and insights 
derived from JPII’s Love and Responsibility, with a specific focus on JPII’s critiques of the 
utilitarian doctrine.  This structure is in place for the following two reasons.  Firstly, Love & 
Responsibility was published after and in response to the writings of famous utilitarians, 
including Mill’s Utilitarianism.  This sequencing respects and accounts for chronology.  
Secondly, though no less thoughtful or well-argued, and although Love and Responsibility is 
much larger than Utilitarianism, the space that JPII specifically devotes to his critique of 
utilitarianism is much smaller than Mill’s Utilitarianism.  In this way, the text with the greater 
amount of content has been given organizational primacy.     
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2: Comparative Overview 
On first principles, John Stuart Mill and John Paul II’s philosophies share some crucial 
insights that may seem synonymous.  Both see the value of pleasure, of utility, of happiness; JPII 
even acknowledges that utility, which is often framed in opposition to love, is an unavoidable 
factor in married love.  The most important difference, however, is their differing interpretation 
of the Biblical First and Second Commandments, the Second of which JPII terms the 
Commandment to Love (and which Mill refers to in the well-known term, “The Golden Rule”). 
On the one hand, Mill’s Utilitarianism comes from the philosophical tradition – 
deductive reasoning, abstractions, and utilitarianism with a strong Benthamite influence, along 
with the added influence of economics, politics, and the sciences.27  On the other hand, JPII’s 
Love and Responsibility stems from the Biblical literary and philosophical tradition.  His 
arguments are founded in Christ’s and the Church’s teachings, Biblical logic, experiential 
knowledge, science, psychology, anthropology, theology.  Despite different disciplinary 
backgrounds and the texts being published a hundred years apart, Mill and JPII’s definitions of 
utilitarianism are similar, as are their views on humankind’s propensity toward it.  Mill argues 
that regardless of their protestations, people of all moral backgrounds ground their lived moral 
doctrine in Happiness theory; utility is humankind’s principle motivation, whether knowingly, 
unknowingly, or denyingly.28  Similarly, JPII characterizes utilitarianism as a “certain theoretical 
notion in ethics as well as a practical program in conduct” whose lifestyle, attitude, and mentality 
have existed since the dawn of man.29  Thus, despite the dissimilar influences of both time period 
and disciplinary backgrounds, each hold similar definitions of utilitarianism and conclude that 
humanity is naturally inclined toward the utilitarian mentality.  (There is, however, a grave 
difference between concluding and condoning, as this paper will discuss). 
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As to the particular versions of utilitarianism to which each philosopher refers, JPII’s 
Love and Responsibility is not a direct critique of Mill’s Utilitarianism – rather, it examines 
classical or hedonistic forms of utilitarianism in general “insofar as [they allow] treating the 
human person instrumentally and reductively”, that is, as a mere means to a useful and 
pleasurable end.30  Additionally, Love and Responsibility does not concern personalistic 
utilitarianism, which treats the person as an end in and of themselves.31  This is, in part, what 
renders comparison of Love and Responsibility to Utilitarianism most interesting – for Mill does 
not strictly qualify as a hedonistic utilitarian.  Instead, his denomination falls under several 
different branches of utilitarianism, including act utilitarianism, ideal-hedonistic utilitarianism, 
normative utilitarianism, and, most notably, personalistic utilitarianism.32  By Mill’s standards, 
this synergetic mix is complementary.  By JPII’s standards and as he states in his critique, 
pairing hedonism and personalism qualifies as a peculiar impossibility, for “a morally good act 
requires the goodness of all its sources together, namely of the object, of the end, and of the 
circumstances, including the consequences”, an ethical belief quite contrary to that of Mill’s.33  
For JPII, all parts preceding, including, and following an action - attitude, intention, “action in 
conformity with conscience”, and consequence, possess moral value.34  Therefore, JPII’s critique 
of utilitarianism applies namely to hedonistic utilitarianism, but also to the incongruous nature of 
hedonistic and personalistic utilitarianism, which Mill champions. 
The opening pages of Utilitarianism mark Mill’s purposes in writing.  First, he intends to 
end centuries of ethical debate over which moral theory holds reality’s one, almighty, objective 
moral standard.  Second, he will examine how humans of varying moral and ethical persuasions 
perceive truth; third, he will differentiate between right and wrong, and fourth, he will establish 
the singular motivation driving human action under which all other motivations fall.  Beginning 
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with the assertion that all actions are oriented toward achieving a certain end, Mill concludes that 
“[happiness and the mitigation of pain is], according to the utilitarian opinion, the [ultimate] end 
of [all] human action”, and that as the ultimate end, it is therefore “the standard of morality”; he 
further argues that global adoption of this principle, whereby each work to ensure others’ 
happiness, will result in universal happiness.35  Mill labels human orientation toward happiness 
and the mitigation of pain as the Greatest Happiness Principle.  
JPII’s general aim is similar in so far as he outlines an objective moral order for the 
proper function of marriages and families, the microcosmic expression of society at large, for it 
is his belief that “as the family goes, so goes the nation, and so goes the whole world in which 
we live.”36  He further argues that because conjugal morality, the topic of Love and 
Responsibility, is a facet of sexual morality, and that because sexual morality is a key facet of 
male-female interaction and coexistence, so too do these principles benefit the fundamental good 
of humanity.37  Therefore, according to Love and Responsibility’s core argument as it relates to 
the Second Commandment, wherever the human person is concerned, all are called by God to 
subordinate themselves to upholding the inalienable dignity of others above self-focused 
considerations.38 
JPII’s argument regarding the harmful nature of classical, hedonistic utilitarianism, 
however, does not lie with Mill’s assertion that actions are oriented toward a specific end – 
rather, JPII challenges Mill’s notion that human actions are always oriented toward happiness, 
and that they cannot be oriented any other way.  While Mill uses human behaviour to deduce the 
objective moral order, JPII precedes all discussion of human behaviour with a theological, 
ontological anthropology of the human person; this he uses to establish an objective moral order.  
He states: man, both subject and object of action, is distinctly human in either case.39  More 
14 
specifically, man, being human, is dignified as a unique, unrepeatable, distinct, rational, 
objective subject, possessing an interior (spiritual) life that is fully equipped with “the power of 
self-determination”.40  Thus, in being fully human and inherently dignified, and in being the 
subject of others’ actions, man must be treated according to certain moral principles.41  It is 
within humanity’s power to treat a person in accordance with these principles, which also means 
that it is possible to orient one’s actions toward ends other than happiness.  For JPII, this general 
principle applies to the realm of sexual intercourse, whereby the woman and the man are 
constant objects of each others’ actions.42  Thus, “[t]o present precisely this structure of man, of 
a man and a woman, within the totality of their vocation to reciprocal love, is the main task of 
[Love and Responsibility].”43 
By contrasting these two aims, we discover that each philosopher conceives of the mind’s 
limits in different ways.  In Mill’s view, it is not possible to act in any way unrelated to or to be 
motivated by something other than (personal, group) happiness and a desire to be free from pain.  
In contrast, JPII holds that the mind possesses the creative potential to prioritize the innate 
dignity of the human person above one’s desire to obtain (personal, group) happiness and 
freedom from pain.  Thus, Mill argues that all things are accountable to Happiness theory, and 
JPII argues that the mind is both capable of rising above feeling and of prioritizing human 
dignity and self-sacrifice over Happiness theory.  These conceptions of humanity’s creative 
limitations colour each philosopher view of human potential, human motives, human action, the 
consequences resulting from them, and the moral implications thereof.  Brief though this insight 
may be, its impact is far-ranging, as this section seeks to demonstrate. 
On human relationships and society, Mill believes that human reasoning, whether 
inductive or deductive, is responsible for determining the moral order.  He also holds that 
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humans possess a socially conditioned, natural desire to be in communion.44  He does not, 
however, explain why humans are capable of being molded to harbour this socially constructed, 
inborn tendency; he only explains how human beings become aware of this need, and how they 
are trained to value it.  In contrast, JPII’s philosophy does explain where this need comes from 
by nature of the fact that he relies on Christian teachings on human, natural and supernatural 
realities.  Ontologically speaking, JPII asserts that humanity is created for a certain purpose, that 
is, community, for “man, being an image of God, cannot find himself unless through a sincere 
gift of self in the communion of persons.”45  In this way, each philosopher holds that humans 
innately value social communion – Mill explains what people should do with this inclination, 
and JPII explains both where this inclination comes from and what should be done with it. 
It would be imprudent to close Part 2 without briefly addressing the major impact of 
Immanuel Kant’s work on each philosophy.  Though Kant’s name is mentioned sparingly 
throughout each text, his insights act as a catalyst for each philosophy’s formation.  While Mill 
held Kant in high regard, finding him to be an illustrious and remarkable man, whose genius 
would range far beyond the era in which he wrote, he disliked Kant’s work very much, and did 
not shy from communicating his distaste in the earliest chapter of Utilitarianism.46  In Mill’s 
view, it was the weakness of popular philosophies like those of Kant and a priori moralists that 
necessitate the utilitarian doctrine.47  Quoting from Kant’s Metaphysics of Ethics (otherwise 
known as Metaphysics of Morals), Mill states: Application of Kant’s universal first principle, 
“So act, that the rule on which thou actest would admit of being adopted as a law by all rational 
beings”, does not discourage society from embracing an immoral doctrine which will lead to the 
most morally illicit “rules of conduct” ever beheld.48  In discrediting Kant and like philosophers, 
Mill proposes Happiness theory as a replacement.49  In Chapter 5 of Utilitarianism Mill even 
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goes so far as to revise Kant’s universal first principle to the following: “[W]e ought to shape 
our conduct by a rule which all rational beings might adopt with benefit to their collective 
interest.”50  In reshaping Kant’s work to suit his iteration of the utilitarian doctrine, Mill argues 
that Kant’s universal law, which benefits doers to the displeasure or harm of those impacted, is 
wrong, and that one must always have the greater good in mind – again, a bold argument for his 
time, given Kant’s popularity.51 
In contrast, JPII held both Kant and Kant’s work in high esteem, so high in fact that he 
too reshapes Kant’s moral imperative to suit his own philosophy.  The main difference, however, 
is that JPII used Kant’s work as a foundational aspect of his philosophy, in contrast to Mill’s 
disparaging and discrediting it.  Interestingly, assuming that JPII’s term elementary principle of 
the moral order is equivalent to Mill’s term first principle, it would appear that each philosopher 
perceives of Kant’s core principle differently.52  Using Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, as opposed to Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, the text from which Mill quotes, JPII aims 
to correct the perennial utilitarian mentality to establish “the natural moral order”.53  He leads 
with the following assertions: each person, possessing both free will and the ability to think, is 
naturally and interiorly (spiritually) capable of determining their own end.54  Therefore, a person 
“can undertake, without harm to himself, a role of, or even serve unknowingly a function of ‘a 
means to an end’”.55  This end must be “truly good, for striving for evil ends is contrary to the 
rational nature of the person.”56  However, the end of the other person in this interaction must in 
every case be good and honourable, and “put the person’s inalienable value before [the] end 
[s/he] strives for”.57  In contrast, to use another solely or merely as a means to an end obstructs 
their natural right and thus violates “the nature of the person” – this must not be done.58   
17 
From these conclusions, JPII revises Kant’s elementary principle from, “‘Act in such a 
way so that the person is never a mere means of your action, but always an end’”, to – 
Whenever the person is an object of action in your conduct, remember that you 
may not treat him merely as a means to an end, as a tool, but [you must] take into 
account that the person himself has or at least should have his end.”  This principle 
thus formulated stands at the basis of every properly comprehended freedom of 
man, especially freedom of conscience.59 
 
This revised edition of Kant’s elementary principle is what JPII uses to discredit and expose the 
incompatibility of personalistic and utilitarian ethics (see Part 5 for analysis).60  Given that this 
reshaped iteration of Kant’s elementary principle plays a most significant role in the formulation 
of JPII’s own core principles and his critique of utilitarianism, and given that Kant’s work acts as 
a driving force behind Mill’s creation of Utilitarianism, it is important to note that this key 
source of inspiration for each philosopher is rooted in two very different interpretations of the 
core of Kant’s moral doctrine.  Mill’s understanding of Kant’s moral imperative results in 
society’s collapse; JPII’s understanding of Kant’s revised moral imperative results in society’s 
betterment.  This apparent discrepancy merits further research and could very well constitute its 
own research paper with an aim to determine the philosopher who had ‘rightly’ interpreted Kant, 
or the reasons behind their two different understandings of his work.  For the purpose of this 
thesis, however, this discussion has been limited to the following conclusions: firstly, JPII 
strongly values the moral rightness of Kant’s elementary principle; secondly, Mill strongly 
rebukes the moral elasticity of Kant’s first principle; thirdly, each use Kant’s ‘first’ principle to 
build on and or prove the necessity of their arguments.  Such is the extent of our analysis of 
Kant’s impact on each text. 
The major conclusions of this section, therefore, are as follows: firstly, neither the time 
period nor the disciplinary background from which each philosophy stems affect either 
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philosopher’s definition of utilitarianism, nor their argument that human beings are inclined 
toward utilitarianism.  Secondly, JPII’s critique of utilitarianism applies primarily to hedonistic 
utilitarianism, but also to the incongruous nature of hedonistic and personalistic utilitarianism, 
which Mill champions.  Thirdly, Mill holds that all action and therefore all morality is oriented 
toward the Greatest Happiness Principle – in contrast, in accordance with the (Second) 
Commandment to Love, JPII holds that in human relationships, all are called to subordinate a 
desire for pleasure and pain’s mitigation to the protection of each person’s inalienable dignity.61  
From this conclusion, fourthly, each philosopher conceives of the mind’s limits differently – for 
Mill, people cannot think outside concerns related to happiness and unhappiness, and for JPII, 
the human person and the human mind is made in God’s image and is therefore capable of 
subordinating concerns for feelings and experiences to the principle of human dignity. 
Fifthly, both Mill and JPII believe that humans are inclined toward social communion.  
While Mill explains what people should do with this inclination, JPII explains the source from 
which this inclination stems (God); in accounting for the source, he then proposes how humans 
should act in accordance with God’s laws.  Sixth and finally, Mill strongly rebukes the moral 
elasticity of Kant’s first principle, as expressed in Kant’s Metaphysics of Ethics, whereas JPII 
strongly values the moral rightness of Kant’s elementary principle, as expressed in Kant’s 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.  Each use their respective interpretations of Kant’s 
primary principle to build on and or prove their philosophies.  
To lay the groundwork for the remainder of this paper, and, in preparation for analyzing 
each philosopher’s different understanding of Christ’s Commandment to Love, and the impact of 
the First Commandment on the Second, one must begin by analyzing each philosopher’s 
conception of utility, pleasure, dignity, and the role that each play in human relationships.  
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3: Prioritizing Utility and Pleasure, or Human Dignity 
Human dignity is to JPII what pleasure and utility are to Mill, that is, sacred to society’s 
effectual, morally licit function.  By defining and comparing what each of these terms – pleasure, 
utility, and human dignity – mean to both philosophers, the role that these realities play in 
constructing their respective moral orders, and their practical implications in human 
relationships, what is brought to light are the differences in their opposing interpretations of the 
Commandment to Love, and thus the implications for following one philosophical roadmap 
toward a more Edenic state of social unity over the other.   
In Mill’s case, because pleasure, the moral arbiter of all consequence, independent of all 
qualification, is inherently moral, human dignity, which is also a moral good, is complementary 
to pleasure.  More specifically, higher pleasures and (personal) happiness cannot conflict with or 
fail to uphold and respect the sanctity of human dignity.  Additionally, a person’s sense of 
dignity is measurable based on the kinds of pleasures in which they choose to engage, therefore, 
a person’s sense of dignity and their innate dignity are subject pleasure (happiness, utility) for 
their moral value.  For JPII, however, in the context of human relationships, pleasure is not the 
moral standard.  In reverse of Mill’s perspective, pleasure is subject to human dignity.  A given 
pleasure’s moral quality depends on its ability to affirm human dignity, thus, while the desire for 
pleasure and utility, at times, complement human dignity, and at other times, they are at total 
odds with it.  Therefore, what Mill holds to be both morally righteous and compatible in all cases 
by way of the pleasure principle, JPII holds that instances of complementarity are case 
dependent, whose moral quality is determined based on Christian notions of human dignity.  To 
each other, each would consider the other to be missing elements critical to living a socially 
respectable and beneficial, morally upstanding existence. 
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We begin by analyzing Mill’s definition of happiness, found at the opening of 
Utilitarianism’s Chapter 2, which gives readers a clear and practical understanding of Mill’s 
definition of moral rightness.  For Mill, happiness, the prime moral virtue, is the first principle on 
which all actions depend upon for their moral value.  An object’s usefulness and the pleasures it 
provides – including enjoyment of beauty, ornament, amusement, and the satisfaction of 
momentary pleasures – in conjunction with exemption from pain, are all critical components of 
Happiness Theory.62  Mill follows with the utilitarian creed: 
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest 
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By 
happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and 
the privation of pleasure.63 
 
Here, the terms moral, utility, and the Greatest Happiness Principle are used to describe the term 
utilitarian.  Hence, utilitarian becomes somewhat synonymous with not only Happiness Theory, 
but also with morality, utility, and the Greatest Happiness.  To that end, to live as a utilitarian is 
to pursue the Greatest Happiness, to have gained utility, to be moral, to be happy and to seek 
happiness, as well as to mitigate pain, unhappiness, the loss of utility, and immorality.   
Mill further defines happiness and unhappiness according to the utilitarian doctrine: “By 
happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation 
of pleasure”.64  In this way, happiness is equated with pleasure, and unhappiness is equated with 
pain.  One is happy if they are experiencing pleasure, and one is unhappy if they are 
experiencing pain.  It is not possible to be happy while experiencing pain, and it is not possible to 
be unhappy while experiencing pleasure, for “pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure.”65  
Morally speaking then, experiencing intellectual, physical (or even spiritual), pleasure would 
constitute a moral good.  Experiencing intellectual, physical, or spiritual pain would constitute a 
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moral evil.  Thus, happiness, which is moral, is always equal to pleasure, and unhappiness, 
which is immoral, is always equal to pain. 
To achieve happiness, Mill recommends actions that promote or produce pleasure, and 
not pain.66  Given that happiness is equated with what is moral, and unhappiness with what is 
immoral, an action must therefore depend upon its consequence to derive its morally licit or 
illicit nature; a consequence must be pleasurable for utility to be gained, and, for the act to be 
morally right.67  Additionally, the action must not result in pain; pain must be absent from the 
outcome to ensure pleasure, happiness, and moral rightness.68  Thus, a certain feeling, a certain 
consequence, felt by the recipient of the action, qualifies as moral or immoral.  Therefore, to be 
utilitarian or to live well as a utilitarian, is to have pursued the Greatest Happiness, to have 
achieved this happiness, to have gained utility, to have experienced pleasure, and to have 
experienced the least pain and unhappiness possible; together, this constitutes the most morally 
righteous and only desirable experience for anyone to champion, pursue, and achieve.69  In sum, 
Happiness theory holds that people are innately oriented toward that which is good, and are 
opposed to that which is evil.  Happiness is, therefore, the moral arbiter of good and evil. 
Few definitions of right and of wrong, of pleasure and of pain could ever be more 
specific than those that Mill provides in the following excerpt.  For Mill, that which constitutes 
pleasure and pain depends on each person’s personal tastes: “what things it includes in the ideas 
of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question.”70  This leaves a great deal 
of interpretation, (moral) elasticity, and personal liberty to utilitarians.  In this way, each may 
form the utilitarian doctrine in whatever way they wish, in whatever manner suits their specific, 
personalized, customizable needs and wants.  Thus, the doctrine of utilitarianism is, in practice, a 
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self-made, self-geared, and self-directed morality, subject to personal sensibilities, tastes, and 
practices.  Good and evil are therefore somewhat open to an individual’s interpretation.  
As detailed in subsequent pages, what follows are statements which run quite contrary to 
JPII’s ethics as discussed in Love and Responsibility’s Chapter I, Part One under the subheading 
“Critique of Utilitarianism”.  Mill plainly states “that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the 
only things desirable as ends”, a statement which, on a sensory level, makes practical sense in 
and of itself, but which is reinforced when one considers that, according to Mill, pleasure is 
equal to moral good, and pain to moral evil. 71  Mill emboldens the separation between right and 
wrong by stating that pleasures and pains are ranked in proportion to the degree that they cause 
(or help to cause) pleasure, and or mitigate (or help to mitigate) pain.72  To illustrate the 
importance of effectively anticipating the moral quality of an action’s outcome (that is, the 
pleasure gained and pain mitigated), Mill argues that in even in extreme cases, heroes and 
martyrs must sacrifice their lives for the greater happiness of a greater number of persons (or, to 
ensure that none will ever ensure the same pain again), and that sacrifices for any other reason 
are wasteful and unnecessary.73  Thus, that which is (or leads to) a pleasant experience, a 
pleasant feeling, a pleasant consequence of an action, preferably the most pleasurable of 
outcomes, and only that which prevents (or leads to the prevention of) a pain-free experience, 
feeling, or consequence, preferably the least painful of outcomes, constitute both desirable and 
morally righteous consequences.   
As Chapter 2 of Utilitarianism dives deeper into addressing the differences between good 
and evil, pleasure and pain, the topic of human dignity begins to emerge amongst Mill’s 
discussion of what this paper terms the pleasure hierarchy.  While the topic of human dignity 
plays a heavy role in the formation of JPII’s philosophy and is the very factor that causes JPII to 
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take grave issue with the utilitarian (hedonistic) mindset, for Mill, this topic is discussed very 
little.  In fact, the term dignity is mentioned only once throughout all of Utilitarianism.  While 
Mill’s use of this term is not an exact match to JPII’s – for Mill speaks of people’s sense of 
personal dignity as opposed to humans possessing an innate dignity independent of one’s 
conscious knowledge of it – this difference accomplishes this paper’s purpose in keenly 
distinguishing between each philosophy, for as is later demonstrated, JPII expresses grave 
concern that dignity is a sorely neglected consideration of the hedonistic utilitarian mentality.74 
Building on his previous statements regarding pleasure’s inherent morally righteous 
quality, Mill leads by asserting that pleasures should be ranked according to the quality of the 
experience; a caveat to this decision making process is that the ranking must be established 
regardless of one’s moral obligation.75  By Mill’s own admission therefore, it would seem that 
this ranking has the potential to be immoral (according to non-utilitarian standards), a concession 
which, as will soon be discussed, presents a very thick philosophical, theological barrier between 
Mill’s Utilitarianism and JPII’s Love and Responsibility on the subject of human dignity.   
With these parameters set, Mill proposes that humans are innately inclined to choose 
higher, intellectual pleasures over lower, sensate, animalistic, hedonistic pleasures, thus defying 
categorization as a strictly hedonistic utilitarian .76  He further asserts that a quality pleasure is 
always chosen over a large quantity of pleasure, and that no sane or intelligent individual, having 
tasted the higher, and having comparing it to the lower, would willingly settle for “a lower grade 
of existence” (this with the exception of those experiencing such severe unhappiness that any 
slightly less painful existence is preferable).77  In this way, Mill argues that the human capacity 
to rationalize will, in any normal case, always lead to choosing a greater good over a lesser good 
– thus, those who know what is good and better, truer, more pleasurable, and more valuable, 
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cannot help but choose it.  Simply put, humanity is instinctively predisposed toward choosing 
what is a ‘greater good’.78  Therefore, Mill holds that the pleasures complement human rational 
and do not degrade or defile it, and that higher pleasures more strongly complement it than those 
that are lower.   
As for the reasons compelling a person to choose one particular good (pleasure) over 
another, these vary.  Mill states that higher pleasure may be chosen out of pride, or love of 
liberty, or power or excitement – the chief reason that the higher are chosen, however, is born out 
of an innate “sense of [one’s own human] dignity”, for that which is desirable is only so if it 
affirms that dignity, thus, Mill’s belief that dignity and higher pleasures, which are most moral, 
are innately compatible.79  Mill states: 
…but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings 
possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion 
to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in 
whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than 
momentarily, an object of desire to them.80 
 
In this way, for Mill, those with a strong sense of dignity – a sense which, generally speaking, is 
more accessible to those who are of greater intelligence – do not choose to engage in lower 
pleasures that do not as strongly affirm this sense.  (Lower pleasures, therefore, are not immoral 
– they are, however, less refined and dignified).  The obvious qualification Mill makes is that a 
person’s “sense of dignity” corresponds to their level of intelligence: “a sense of dignity, which 
all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, 
proportion to their higher faculties…”.81  Given that one’s sense of dignity corresponds to 
intelligence, Mill states, the being of an inferior intellect (those possessing a lower sense of 
personal dignity), will be easily satisfied, while the being with the superior intellect (those who 
have a greater sense of dignity) will find every happiness somewhat wanting due to their greater 
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wisdom, understanding, and knowledge of, for example, all the pleasures to be had.82  In sum, a 
person’s sense of dignity and the pleasures in which they choose to engage correspond to their 
level of intelligence.  It is better to be wise, to be rational, to have a deeper sense of dignity, and 
to be empty of fulfillment, than to be an ignorant, satiated pig, with a shallow sense of dignity – 
“better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”83  In connection with this section’s 
discussion of moral good and moral evil, once the more pleasurable, dignity-affirming good is 
chosen over the lower good, so too is the greater moral good chosen, and thus one’s dignity more 
greatly honoured.  Therefore, those with a greater sense of dignity also have a greater 
understanding of moral good and moral evil, and act in accordance with their inclination toward 
what is ‘good’.  (Consequently, they also have a deeper understanding of what it means to “love 
one’s neighbour as oneself” – more on this in Part 5). 
 For JPII, however, dignity is not a small topic of discussion, but the basis for the moral 
maxims he presents to remedy what he considers to be utilitarianism’s failings.  From Love and 
Responsibility’s outset, and as established in Part 1 of this paper, JPII argues that human beings 
are, without question and in every instance, innately dignified – unique, unrepeatable, distinct, 
rational, objective subject, possessing an interior (spiritual) life fully capable of self-
determination – conclusions that set a stark contrast to Mill’s primary focus on pleasure being 
the moral arbiter and affirmer of goodness.84  Expanding on Christian teaching, JPII states that 
each human person, fully dignified, necessitates respect regardless of intelligence, regardless of 
one’s personal tastes, disposition toward pleasure and pain, and so forth.85  Therefore, interacting 
with another human person, becoming the subject of their actions or vice-versa, requires a moral 
code – not one that is open to interpretation or customizable to personal tastes and sensibilities.86  
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This, he argues, is particularly pertinent where people become subjects of action in the sexual 
realm, particularly in marriages and families, the microcosmic expression of society.87   
JPII demonstrates sympathy for aspects of utilitarianism.  To start, he acknowledges that 
the utilitarian standard (where one seeks pleasure, avoids pain, and ranks pleasures and pains 
according to their personal tastes), seems morally right, attractive, rational, and compatible with 
human instinct.88  Like Mill, JPII also holds that people are oriented toward what is good – 
“[S]triving for evil ends is contrary to the rational nature of the person. … The point is precisely 
to seek true ends, that is, true goods as ends of action, and to find and show ways for their 
realization.”89  Despite somewhat similar positions on these points, in direct contrast to an act 
utilitarian such as Mill, JPII argues that all parts preceding, including, and following an action – 
that is, attitude, intention, “action in conformity with conscience”, and consequence – possess 
moral value.90  While a utilitarian judges what can be seen to determine moral quality, God 
judges what is unseen – “‘God does not see as human beings see; they look at appearances but 
Yahweh looks at the heart.’”91  Therefore, for JPII, not only do good and evil exist outside the 
realm of human action and human consequence, they also exist outside the realm of human 
beings and human consciousness.  Moreover, negative and positive consequences can occur 
without their ever having a known pleasurable or painful effect on any human person or any 
sentient being.  Thus, for JPII, immoral behaviour exists beyond the known or unknown 
consequences of human action.  In this way, JPII’s definitions of good, evil, and all they 
encompass are far different than Mill’s. 
On the subject of good and evil, and in contrast to Mill, JPII does not consider pleasure to 
be the moral standard.  Rather, he holds Happiness theory to be an illogical means of 
ascertaining right from wrong, for as he states, pleasure “in its essence is something collateral, 
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accidental, something that may occur when acting”, therefore, “undertaking to act for the sake of 
pleasure itself as the exclusive or highest end naturally clashes with the proper structure of 
human acts.”92  Surprisingly, despite what JPII holds to be a human inability to accurately 
forecast the moral quality of an outcome, he also argues that this does not make actions or wants 
associated with pleasure or pain’s mitigation to be inherently immoral, nor is it immoral to want 
or act to achieve pleasure or mitigate pain.93  Rather, he states that pleasure is not the only good 
unto which all other goods, including morality and human action, are subordinate, for some 
morally conscionable deeds require pleasure’s mitigation and an experience of pain.94  All this, 
including JPII’s assertion that pleasure, being rather elusive, and resulting from some concrete 
act, is incalculable before acting, leads him to conclude that pleasure and the mitigation of pain 
not only cannot logically be but “[are] not the final criterion for [one’s] rational conduct.”95 
Here, we reach JPII’s primary critique of utilitarianism.  By comparing JPII’s altered 
version of Kant’s apparent moral imperative to Mill’s understanding of Kant’s apparent moral 
imperative, we begin to understand why a Christian such as JPII would hold personalistic and 
utilitarian ethics to be incompatible.96  Summarizing, JPII states: because all morals and actions 
are subordinate to happiness, it becomes impossible to honour people as ideal ends in and of 
themselves.97  This is because happiness is not a person – it is an experience and a feeling. 98  If 
the only good and moral thing is an experience of positive emotional-affective moments, then to 
be moral, one has no choice but to use another person to achieve this feeling.99  Thus, all things, 
including oneself, become a means to maximize pleasant mood-feelings.100  With this attitude, 
there is a high risk that one will transgress against the dignity of another for the sake of pleasure, 
be it higher or lower; this can be done with or without the other’s consent.101  It is even possible 
to transgress against oneself for the sake of pleasure.102  JPII takes grave issue with (hedonistic) 
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utilitarianism because he does not consider such actions to be ‘good’ and moral ways of 
interacting with other human beings.  Mill’s iteration of utilitarianism would be no exception.  
To JPII, one may feel as though their sense of dignity has been honoured by achieving a lower or 
(preferably) a higher pleasure for oneself or for another.  By virtue of the Greatest Happiness 
Principle being a poor judge of moral good and evil, however, the doer or receiver’s innate, God-
given dignity may well have been dishonoured.   
By combining the logic of Mill’s Utilitarianism and of JPII’s Love and Responsibility (as 
discussed on pages 10, 11, 23 and 24 of Love and Responsibility), JPII’s understanding of the 
utilitarian mentality is simply summarized: pleasure, a subjective experience and feeling, 
motivates human action.  Therefore, pleasure is also the moral standard, a standard to which all 
human persons are subject.  In this way, human persons cannot be ideal ends in and of 
themselves and are reduced to mere tools for the amusement of others and oneself.103 
If a person’s sense of dignity is accountable to pleasure, would Mill hold that a person’s 
innate dignity is also accountable to pleasure?  Because JPII critiques hedonistic utilitarianism in 
general as opposed to Mill’s Utilitarianism specifically, and because Mill’s utilitarian brand is a 
blend of hedonism, personalism (and so forth), to determine the degree to which similarities and 
differences exist between Mill and JPII’s valuation of human dignity, one must extrapolate from 
Mill’s definition of a person’s sense of dignity to determine his probable opinion on this matter.  
Using several of Mill’s axiomatic statements about truth and the way that humans operate, one 
can surmise the following: Mill has stated that “actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”104  An action’s 
moral quality is therefore accountable to happiness theory.  Innate dignity is, however, not an 
action.  So, while a person’s sense of dignity is accountable to Happiness Theory – that is, 
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measurable based on the kinds of pleasures in which they engage – a person’s innate dignity 
exists independent of action and is therefore in no way subject to Happiness Theory.  This, 
however, is a flawed conclusion.   
To achieve Mill’s aim of creating a unified society, human interaction must occur.  For 
human interaction to occur, people must act on each other.  In acting on each other, a person’s 
innate dignity would either be affirmed or defiled.  If humans only act to achieve happiness and 
to mitigate pain, it therefore follows that dignity-affirming actions would result in positive, 
happy-inducing, pleasurable outcomes, and dignity-defiling actions would result in negative, 
pain-inducing outcomes.  Because the end of an action can only be oriented toward feelings of 
greater happiness and or less pain, everything in between, including the human person, becomes 
subject to the Greatest Happiness Principle.105  Thus, for Mill, while (higher) pleasures are 
complementary to and affirm human dignity, dignity must be subject to pleasure, to Happiness 
theory, in an effort to live in and unify society, because people cannot be unified without moral – 
that is, pleasurable – action.  Pleasure is the moral standard, therefore, for Mill, pleasure outranks 
dignity in terms of importance. 
In sum, while Mill’s bottom-up approach focuses on how a person’s level of self-
awareness of their dignity determines the kind of moral behaviour in which they choose to 
engage, JPII’s top-down approach focuses on how a person’s innate dignity determines the moral 
behaviour in which they should engage.  Thus, for Mill, pleasure informs dignity, and for JPII, 
dignity informs pleasure.  Furthermore, in Mill’s case, as this paper postulates, a person’s innate 
dignity is also accountable to the Greatest Happiness Principle.  Additionally, contrary to Mill, 
JPII does not consider pleasure (or higher pleasures, whatever that means to the specific people 
assessing them), to be automatically compatible with human dignity.   
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In sum, it is this same top-down approach that JPII uses to dismantle the utilitarian 
argument that pleasure is inherently moral and, with human compliance, capable of social 
unification.  According to JPII, when everything is subordinated to pleasure (again, be it higher 
or lower, and despite a person ‘feeling’ as though their sense of dignity has been honoured), 
every person is reduced to mere subjects of action, objects of use, and none are granted respect 
for their inherent dignity, which they so rightly deserve, given that they are dignified, and, given 
that they are images of God Himself, the source from which this dignity flows.106  In 
dishonouring the (Second) Commandment to Love, therefore, so too is its source, the (First) 
Commandment to love God above all else, dishonoured. 
Given Love & Responsibility’s keen focus on marriage and family life, JPII offers sexual 
relations as a prime example of a realm in which another’s dignity is often dishonoured.  
Contrary to Mill’s appreciation for and prioritization of pleasure above all else, JPII argues that, 
when one’s end is only happiness and pleasure, only use and egoism can occur between the man 
and woman – never love and authentic altruism.107  JPII provides two reasons for this.  The first 
– pleasure (happiness) is temporary by nature, “belonging solely to a given subject – it is not a 
supra-subjective or transsubjective good.  As long as this good is considered to be the complete 
basis of the moral norm, there can be no way of transcending what is good only for me” – 
therefore, in accordance with JPII’s logic any ‘benevolent’ attempt of Mill-type utilitarians to 
“love [or pleasure] their neighbour as themselves” would be disingenuous, failing to truly 
demonstrate Christ-like selflessness and charity.108   
Thus, the second reason JPII provides – though ensuring the greatest pleasure for the 
greatest number may look altruistic, it is actually still egoism, and would not result in the unified 
society for which Mill aims.109  Summarizing, JPII states that those who harbour this mentality 
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act in others’ interest not because it “it brings [them] pleasure that somebody else feels 
pleasure”.110  When it no longer does, however, their commitment to others’ pleasure “ceases to 
be… binding, something good, and may even become something evil”, something painful.111  In 
this way, one becomes either indifferent to or attempts to thwart others’ pleasure-attainment.112  
It therefore follows that none could hope to achieve the higher, most moral and customizable 
‘dignity-affirming’ pleasures for which Mill aims, others would either be opposed to or fail to 
support opposed to an individual’s happiness.  Thus, the happily unified society for which Mill 
aims could not be achieved. 
This difficulty, JPII states, is not resolved by the sexual harmonization of two egoisms, 
for as the aforementioned conclusion argues, ‘love’ of this kind views the opposite sex merely as 
“mutually useful and mutually advantageous.113  Once the mutual usefulness and advantage 
cease, nothing remains from this whole harmony.”114  In this way, what appeared as love reveals 
itself as mere reciprocal use, and treats the person as means to a subjective end – “[l]ove is then 
nothing in the persons and nothing between them.”115  Such an outcome is undesirable, even to a 
(hedonistic) utilitarian, for the fallout causes much unhappiness and pain.116   
In summary of JPII’s argument and perspective, when pleasure – a personal, subjective 
reality, a feeling – is held to be the only good, a person becomes incapable of altruism.117  
Therefore, utilitarianism in its hedonistic form (or hedonistic-personalistic blend, as in the case 
of Mill), cannot help but be self-focused, egoistic, and therefore opposed to moral goodness.  
Despite each philosopher having a shared interest in social unification, JPII holds that any such 
personalistic aims of Mill’s doctrines, could never be fully realized, an outcome antithetical to 
Mill’s purpose.  Moreover, not even Mill’s goal of attaining higher, morally elevated pleasures 
could be achieved, for to focus solely on happiness results in selfish attitudes that are either 
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indifferent to or hostile toward others’ happiness, which in turn means that none are happy.  
Thus, for true altruism and ‘goodness’ to be achieved, feelings – both others’ and one’s own 
experience of pleasure and pain – must be accountable and subject to the dignity of the person.   
From a Christian perspective, when one considers a Mill-type argument in light of JPII’s 
focus on marriage, family, and human relationships, Mill’s aim to ensure the greatest happiness 
and the least pain for the greatest number translates to the following:  if something, or someone, 
does not suit one’s subjective, personal pleasure-preference and practices, then they are not 
desirable.118  They are therefore useless and morally valueless to the judger, for “pleasure, and 
freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends”.119  By default, they become pain-
inducing entities, moral evils, that should be abhorred.   
The fact that a person’s worth might also be determined and tested without care for moral 
obligation simply adds to the gravity of JPII’s admonishment of utilitarianism, as expressed 
throughout Love and Responsibility, beginning on page twenty.120  By this standard, after having 
tested multiple human persons to determine whether their moral value suits ‘the tester’s’ 
personal tastes, it follows that one person might become a greater good than another person; this 
translates to the following mentality: some people make me happy, and some do not.  Some 
cause me some form of pleasure, and some cause me some form of pain – therefore, the former 
are of value, and the latter are not.  Some people are good, and others are not; some are moral 
righteous entities, and others are not.  Additionally, some people pleasure me more than others, 
and are therefore of greater moral value (to me). All this is ranked using the pleasure hierarchy, 
which is beholden to that which best suits me personally, regardless of morality.  Therefore, I 
treat others according to their worth as they relate to my personal preferences.  Clearly, 
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according to JPII’s logic, this valuation of the human person requires obstruction of their inborn 
right to self-determination, and thus their dignity.121   
In this way, JPII holds that ranking the value of human life on this basis is morally 
wrong, for human dignity will always outrank the value of a feeling and of a pleasant or painful 
experience.  It is wrong and evil, for instance, to rank the quality of a human life based on their 
intelligence, to merely use them in an effort to derive ‘lower-grade pleasures’, or the degree to 
which their intelligence is of use to or pleases ‘me’.  According to the marital-spousal lens 
through which JPII critiques utilitarianism, it is also wrong to rank the quality of a human life 
based on their ability to please ‘me’ sexually, to make ‘me’ feel good physically.  Instead, JPII 
advocates for limitless love – love that lasts regardless of pleasure and pain involved, even 
regardless of how morally righteous or sinful another person may be.  This unconditional love, 
which lies at the heart of Christianity, is the same love that Christ exhibits when he lays down his 
life for all humanity regardless of reciprocation. 
We love him along with his virtues and vices, in a sense independently of the 
virtues and despite the vices.  The greatness of this love is manifested the most 
when this person falls, when his weakness or even sins come to light.  One who 
truly loves does not then refuse his love [out of mere reaction to loss of affectivity, 
sensuality, etc.], but in a sense loves even more – he loves while being conscious of 
deficiencies and vices without, however, approving of them.  For the person 
himself never loses his essential value.122 
 
When contrasting Mill and JPII’s views on their separate valuations of pleasure, utility, 
and human dignity, one may be compelled to ask: are utility and use inherently immoral to JPII?  
Is it morally wrong for one human person to be of use to another, or for one to derive utility from 
an experience of pleasure?  Does JPII believe that this qualifies as harming, dishonouring, and 
trespassing on another person’s innate dignity and worth?  Is it possible to uphold human dignity 
while also deriving utility and enjoyment from human relationships and marriage?  Moreover, is 
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it possible to love someone selflessly and to completely avoid using them, or to completely avoid 
deriving utility from them?  If one were to rely solely on popular notions of Christian-Catholic 
teaching on human sexuality in unison with an improper understanding of JPII’s teaching on 
human sexuality and utilitarianism, many would be inclined to believe that, from a Christian 
standpoint, use, utility, and pleasure are inherently morally evil. 
Nothing could be further from the core ethics of Love and Responsibility.123   
To properly understand JPII’s argument, one must make clearer distinctions between use, 
utility, pleasure, moral rightness, etc.  For while Mill (more or less) marks these as synonymous 
entities under the umbrella of Happiness theory, JPII takes great care to distinguish each from the 
other.  He begins by separating usefulness into two categories.   
The first meaning of usefulness for JPII is “to employ [and subordinate] some object of 
action [for the sake of the actor, and purely] as a means to [a specific and desirable] end.”124  
Practically speaking, this means that the object of use is servile, or, used instrumentally, when 
subordinated to the end and to the acting subject.125  JPII states that to subordinate a person to 
use in this manner is perfectly moral when affirming the value of a person, and when 
accompanied by a mentality of justice, moderation, reverence, gentleness, stewardship, and 
respect for the dignity inherent in both animate and inanimate nature (especially when the object 
in use is “capable of suffering”).126   
The complexity of respectful subordination occurs when another human person is 
concerned, and is doubly complicated when applied to the realm of sexual intercourse, if one 
envisions their spouse as merely “a means…to attain various [sexual] ends”.127  According to 
JPII, people are ends in and of themselves, but, a person can subject themselves to use provided 
that the other person with whom they are in relationship prizes their dignity above the 
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honourable end for which they strive.128  God neither created man to be used merely 
instrumentally, nor does he use them merely instrumentally – therefore, man must also refrain 
from using his fellow man merely instrumentally.129  Incidentally, in loving another as God 
commands, so too is God honoured. 
JPII defines the second meaning of the verb ‘to use’ as deriving pleasure from both action 
and the object of action (another human person).130  Here, “the person becomes a proper source 
of variously coloured pleasure or even delight.”131  Although such moods and feelings (be they 
pleasurable or painful), are separate entities from action, they are nonetheless linked 
experientially to action, and affect how a person perceives the opposite sex – that is, “the source 
of lived-experiences”, their equal object and “’partner’ of action” – in the context of 
relationships and relations.132  In this way, since “personhood and rationality generate morality”, 
it follows that people need sexual ethics – an understanding of “the proper relation of the person 
in the context of sexual pleasure” – so that they do not become dominated and used.133 
Based on this conclusion, JPII characterizes (marital conjugal) pleasure in the following 
way: firstly, pleasure is a temporary, subjective, non-transferable experience.134  It is not bad.135  
It is not inherently morally evil.136  It is not, however, the prime moral virtue – “[p]leasure itself 
is a specific good”; it must, however, be placed in a hierarchy, for “it is not the only good”.137  
Pleasure must be fully justified, properly ordered, and raised above “mere sexual self-giving 
[…to the level of] self-giving of the person”; this fosters both spousal community and the proper 
attitude toward the person with whom one is in relationship.138  In this way, pleasure must be 
treated as a fruit, a biproduct, of the self-giving of one’s person to another, not as the end or aim 
of one’s action as hedonistic utilitarianism proposes.139  This hierarchy ensures the honouring of 
the personalistic norm.   
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Thus, “I desire to experience pleasure, to fulfill a need in me” – an interior mentality that 
often masquerades as true love, becomes “I desire to honour and affirm my spouse’s right to self-
determination and their inherent, God given dignity as a person, made in his image.  I will 
‘[strive] for [their] true good, for union in the true common good’; I will do so by dying to 
myself, by giving myself wholly to my spouse.  I will seek the person, rather than merely 
experience.”140  This act of true love, of true self-giving, of laying down one’s life for one’s 
friend, can occur in many areas of marriage, including the conjugal union.  Conjugal intercourse 
produces much fruit – one of which is pleasure.141  Therefore, conjugal pleasure is not evil, but it 
must result from self-giving, spousal love, and it must be accountable to human dignity, 
otherwise, it does not ascend from the level of mere use of another human person.  Thus, another 
clear demonstration that Mill and JPII swap pleasure (utility) and human dignity in terms of 
priority and importance. 
Beyond Chapter I, Part One of Love and Responsibility, JPII discusses the major barrier 
inhibiting man from harbouring an inborn orientation toward action subordinate to and respectful 
of another person’s innate dignity – that is, the Christian notion of Original Sin (first introduced 
in the story of Adam and Eve’s fall from grace, found in Genesis).  He begins by addressing any 
non-Christian, Manichean, misinterpretations of his work, acknowledging humanity’s inborn 
struggle to maintain purity of heart and mind.  He states: man’s spontaneous reaction of 
concupiscence of the flesh, sensuality and “even … affectivity” are a result of Original Sin; to 
experience these things is not to sin, however, “for sin can only be what proceeds [with consent] 
from the will”:142 
This attitude of sensuality, which ‘hinders the lived-experience of beauty, even 
bodily sensual beauty [by introducing] a consumer relation to the object’ is 
spontaneous, instinctive.  In this form, however, it is not, above all, something 
morally evil, but is above all something natural.143 
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JPII adds to this discussion of humanity’s fallen, natural inclination toward pleasure in Chapter 
III, The Person and Chastity – Part One: The Person and Chastity; here he also addresses the 
Christian view of the state of these human inclinations before the fall: 
The truth about original sin explains this elementary and at times prevailing evil, 
namely, that when encountering a person of the other sex, man does not know how 
to “love” simply and spontaneously, but his whole approach to this person becomes 
interiorly disturbed by the desire to “use,” which at times rises above “loving” and 
deprives love of its proper essence while often keeping up only its appearance.144 
 
In this way, JPII argues that human beings are bound within a pre-existing, fallen orientation 
toward pleasure that cannot be overcome.145  Christianity holds that although humanity is 
responsible for bringing this fallen human nature upon themselves through an act of free will, 
there is no way to undo this spontaneous, fallen, natural inclination – only God’s Second Coming 
will redeem this brokenness.146  In the meantime, hope for redemption is found in what can be 
overcome, for despite the fact that the spontaneous reaction is followed by a choice – an 
opportunity to actively will and do something different than that to which these inclinations 
incline a person.147  Summarizing, though “all have sinned and are deprived of the glory of 
God”, through choice to rise above sin that can be overcome, and in union with God’s grace, 
humans are equipped to bring about a moral good despite the oppressive boundaries of their 
Original fallen human nature.148   
Thus, “the threshold of sin lies” between one’s fallen, spontaneous, uncontrolled reaction 
to their loved one’s sexual value alone, and the choice that follows.149  The choice is to love 
one’s loved one, to sacrifice concerns for personal pleasure, even for one’s spouse’s pleasure, to 
ensure that the mentality accompanying the action is honourable and respects the other as an 
autonomous being worthy of pure, noble, gentle, considerate action, not a mere outlet for 
consumption and discarding.  Instead of allowing the pleasure of spontaneous concupiscence, 
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sensuality and affectivity to be the moral arbiters of an experience as Mill would propose – that 
is, pleasurable emotions and experiences that come without effort and that can dishonour others 
when not properly tamed – one must work to elevate them to the level of self-giving, spousal 
love – man “cannot acknowledge them as love, but only must bring love out of them.”150  As JPII 
states, echoing the words of Saint Paul in Romans Chapter 7, a certain pain accompanies this” 
rejection of spontaneity, an effort which requires self-mastery:151   
So I find this rule: that for me, where I want to do nothing but good, evil is close at 
my side.  In my inmost self I dearly love God's law, but I see that acting on my body 
there is a different law which battles against the law in my mind.  So I am brought to 
be a prisoner of that law of sin which lives inside my body.152 
 
The struggle against evil toward goodness, fought within the mind – the hidden place where 
intention and motivation reside and where choices are made – is the better part above mere use 
of another person for one’s own personal, non-transsubjective nor supra-subjective 
satisfaction.153  For in consenting to act on mere sensuality, affectivity, and or concupiscence of 
the flesh, one determines a non-consensual, dishonourable end for the person on whom they act, 
therefore “[threatening the other’s] natural power of self-determination” and thus their dignity.154   
JPII adds that this approach is not only an affront to another’s dignity, it is also an affront 
to relationship.  True love of the person is jeopardized when a relationship is based solely on 
emotional-affective reactions, for when these reactions eventually pass away, disappointment 
ensues, and affective love for the person becomes affective hate.155  (Such pain-inducing 
outcomes are undesirable even to the utilitarian, particularly to one like Mill, whose wish is to 
unite society).  This argument further affirms JPII’s argument that man, created by a God who 
gives and creates and loves unconditionally, “finds himself … through a sincere gift of self 
[elevated to the level of true love within] the communion of persons.”156  Thus, while JPII may 
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appreciate Mill’s aim to unify society, he considers it a great sorrow that hedonism would derail 
this good and moral aspiration. 
For Christians of JPII’s persuasion, the aim, therefore, is not to repress or reject these 
feelings or reactions, but to choose to elevate them to the level of love, love of another.157  Any 
use, utility, and sexual pleasure derived from actions and experiences of another person becomes 
“subordinat[e] to love”.158  In simpler terms, while it is true that the sexual inclination toward 
pleasure ‘just kind of happens’ without human consent, what follows are many available paths 
for action that do require consent, free choice, and responsibility (though morally culpable 
individuals exclude those with “a faulty recognition of the structure of the person-recipient” who 
therefore commit unintended “act[s] of anti-love”).159  In practical terms, to negate the possibility 
of (mere) use, including those instances of “secret sin” unbeknownst even to the action’s doer, 
the role must suit the relationship, and spouses must have a common end, specifically children, 
family, the strengthening of their spousal relationship.160  Therefore, contrary to Mill’s proposal 
to leave pleasure as the moral arbiter of experience, JPII argues that there is a level of human 
decency that exists above feeling which must be accessed for social harmony and respect for 
persons to be achieved. 
 It is noteworthy to close with one added insight regarding Catholic family planning, 
addressed in Love and Responsibility’s Chapter One, Part Two: Interpretation of the Drive.  The 
preceding discussion of JPII’s views on marriage, sex, and family relate to use of one’s spouse as 
a means to a pleasurable end, which JPII characterizes as the utilitarian-type, Freudian 
libidinistic interpretation of the drive; this mentality during conjugal intercourse is oriented 
toward sexual delight, and children (as opposed to pleasure) are viewed as accidental, collateral 
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properties of this union.161  This is, of course, a reversal of JPII’s establishment of the moral 
order.   
Interestingly, however, while children and family are one of two crucial common ends of 
marriage and the conjugal union, the Pope states that “the Creator wills not only the preservation 
of the species through sexual intercourse, but also its preservation based on love that is worthy of 
persons”, meaning that a woman, or a man, are not used as a means to an end merely to create 
children.162  In the same way that the first century Church denounced the Manicheanism, so too 
does JPII denounce both these views as well as the following rigoristic and puritan notions of 
human sexuality that apply a useful utilitarian attitude to conjugal intercourse:  
[M]arriage and sexual intercourse are good only when they serve procreations. 
Hence, a man acts well when he uses a woman as an indispensable means for 
producing offspring.  … Evil is only the use according to the second meaning, that 
is, seeking pleasure in sexual intercourse … a component that is in itself ‘unclean,’ 
some sui generis necessary evil.163 
 
Contrary to popular notions of Catholic views on marriage and family, viewing the body as 
evil and pleasure as evil, as well as the procreation of children as the only purpose of the 
conjugal union, also runs contrary to the core ethics of Christianity.  JPII states that “[t]he 
only way to overcome this uti is to receive beside it the second, fundamentally distinct 
possibility that St. Augustine calls frui.  For there exists a joy that is in conformity with the 
nature of the sexual drive and is at the same time adapted to the level of persons.”164  This 
clarification is important, for while some may conclude that the Church detests pleasure in 
all its forms, and that only those who enjoy this fruit of an action are immoral, so too does 
JPII untwist a skewing of Christian truth existing at the opposite side of the spectrum.  
While Mill’s views on pleasure are simpler and more straightforward, JPII chooses to 
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make distinctions between moral goods and evils related to pleasure at various junctions so 
that human dignity might be consistently prioritized above it. 
Therefore, according to JPII, utility, pleasure, use – each are distinct entities and must be 
treated as such, and yet, it is not possible to separate the derivation of some utility, some use, 
some pleasure from human interaction.  This is the nature of human relationships – that one will 
receive when they give (even though giving to receive is not their goal).  One must remember, 
therefore, that any use, utility, and pleasure derived from an experience of happiness must be tied 
to the person.  The key is to allow the person with whom one is in relationship to determine their 
own end, not for the doer to determine their end for them, as in the case of a spouse who reduces 
their partner as a mere means to their personal pleasure; affirming the other’s dignity in this way, 
placing the person, the relationship, and children above the use and pleasure derived in the 
experience of the marital embrace, constitutes true love and true respect.  This is how JPII 
envisions pleasure’s proper place in marriage and family, and with respect to human dignity.  
Though Mill and JPII share an interest in achieving an Edenic sort of social cohesion, JPII’s 
vision for pleasure’s place in this plan is much more moderated than Mill’s. 
In summary of this section, both philosophers value utility and pleasure, and both 
philosophers see it as a good, but the moral weight and importance attributed to them, the way in 
which one achieves them, and the mindset present when deriving them, whether through thought, 
action, or consequence – on these subjects, each have very different answers, as demonstrated in 
the moral weight that they attribute to human dignity.   
Mill and JPII agree that people are oriented toward what is good.  This simple statement, 
marks where similarities cease to exist, however, for each philosopher’s definition of ‘good’ 
varies strongly.  While Mill argues that because people act to obtain happiness, happiness must 
42 
also be the standard of moral goodness, and proceeds to form a moral order on this simple, 
straightforward basis, JPII takes great care to pause on this first principle and to slowly 
deconstruct the various reasons why this moral standard could, in his view, never achieve the 
social cohesion for which it aims, for it would require the obstruction of a person’s innate dignity 
(and thus their subsequent harm), an outcome quite contrary to what is good.    
Mill’s discussion of pleasure centers on the following conclusions: to be a utilitarian is to 
pursue the Greatest Happiness, to have gained utility, to be moral, to be happy and or to seek 
happiness, to mitigate pain, unhappiness, the loss of utility, and immorality, for pain is 
heterogeneous with pleasure.  Therefore, because pleasure and pain are the outcome of action, 
the moral quality of an action depends on the consequence.  That which specifically constitutes 
happiness is open to interpretation – for happiness is a broad term applied to ensure that each can 
customize their pleasurable experiences to their specific tastes, sensibilities, practices.  With 
these customizations available, one must recall that pleasures according to the pleasure hierarchy 
– quality (higher, intellectual pleasures), outrank quantity (lower, sensate pleasures).  Thus, in 
the same way that happiness is open to individual interpretation, so too are moral goodness 
(which is synonymous with pleasure) and moral evil (synonymous with pain). 
By comparing JPII’s work with that of Mill, we can conclude that the term dignity would 
likely have two different applications for Mill.  On the one hand is a person’s sense of dignity, 
and on the other a person’s ‘innate dignity’ as JPII would say.  Mill holds that person’s sense of 
dignity is measurable based on the types of pleasures in which they choose to engage.  
Willingness to engage in higher pleasures likely means a higher level of intelligence, and 
therefore a greater personal sense of dignity.  The opposite is true for those who engage in lower 
grade pleasures.  Additionally, higher pleasures complement a person’s dignity and do not defile 
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it.  Thus, once the more pleasurable, dignity-affirming good is chosen over the lower good, so 
too is the greater moral good chosen.  Therefore, those with a greater sense of dignity also have a 
greater understanding of moral good and moral evil, and act in accordance with their inclination 
toward the good.  In the same way that a person’s sense of dignity is dependent on pleasure for 
its measurable quality, so too is a person’s innate dignity accountable to pleasure. 
In contrast to Mill, JPII adamantly argues that what is ‘good’ is not necessarily 
happiness-, pleasure-, or utility-inducing, nor is it necessarily what Mill would term higher 
pleasures.  More simply, morality is not one that is open to interpretation or customizable to a 
person’s unique tastes and sensibilities. Pleasure is a good, but not the only good, for pain is, at 
times, required to do what is right and good.  That, in addition to his argument that a doctrine 
which seeks to determine a consequence’s moral quality based on attempts to forecast an action’s 
pleasurable or painful outcomes is both illogical and impractical, leads JPII to conclude that 
Happiness theory cannot be the standard of morality.  On this standard he continues, but with 
specific reference to human relationships.  JPII argues that subordinating all things to happiness, 
a feeling, means that people become a means to happiness where human relationships are 
concerned.  This obstructs a human’s dignity, that is, their innate ability to self-determination.  
Therefore, though one may sense that their dignity has been honoured in choosing pleasure over 
pain, or in selecting higher pleasures over lower, because the Greatest Happiness Principle is a 
poor judge of moral good and evil, the doer or receiver’s innate, God-given dignity may well 
have been dishonoured.   
JPII continues – because happiness is not transsubjective nor suprasubjective, subjecting 
morality, all things, and all people to happiness cannot foster truly altruistic forms of community, 
an outcome which runs contrary to the personalistic utilitarian’s aim.  Moreover, harmonizing 
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the interests of an egoistic community of persons also leads to fallible forms of community, for 
when community is no longer pleasurable to its participants, none thereafter will participate.  In 
the wake of the community’s breakdown, these same people with attitudes of egoism either 
neglect others’ wellbeing or will seek others’ harm.  In this way, according to JPII, Mill-type 
utilitarianism creates an opportunity for people to become a means to an end, rated within a 
pleasure hierarchy that is subject to each person’s personal tastes.  Even attempts to affirm one’s 
own dignity with higher pleasures customized to suit a person’s personal tastes could not be 
achieved, for each may well be opposed to others’ happiness.  Therefore, JPII advocates for a 
love and respect that outlasts others’ virtue, vice, and sin. 
Using marriage as the foundation of his example, JPII states that utility and pleasure are 
not evil, and that humanity’s natural inclination to pleasure is also not evil.  Though inclination 
toward pleasure alone is not a sin, however, it is a result of Original Sin, and humans must be 
trained to respond properly to this fallen inclination.  Therefore, to refrain from using the person 
with whom one is in relationship as a mere means to an end, JPII states that one must prioritize a 
person’s ability to self-determine their own end.  Evil is born when pleasure and the mitigation 
of pain alone is chosen (or willed) above a sincere gift of self made for the good of the other.  
Therefore, for JPII, and as stated in God’s first decree to humanity as detailed in Genesis, the 
ideal end of the microcosmic society of marriage is for spouses to be fruitful, to multiply, and 
(not or) to strengthen the spousal relationship.165  Pleasure and utility fully justified in this way 
honours others’ dignity and grants them the respect naturally owed to them.  This way of married 
life must be supported by society and for society’s proper function. 
In layman’s terms, and as this section demonstrates, Mill’s utilitarian motto is as follows: 
do not repress your enjoyment of pleasure, rather, enjoy it freely, this with a mind for the social 
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ramifications of your actions.  This is the end toward which humans naturally work, therefore, it 
is also the moral standard, and the standard by which society must operate for the fullest possible 
realization of the Greatest Happiness Principle to be achieved.  Such an outlook complements a 
person’s dignity, which is subject to pleasure. In contrast, strictly on the level of persons, JPII’s 
Christian motto is to enjoy the person continually, to elevate pleasure to the level of love and 
self-gift, and, in reverse of Mill, to subordinate pleasure to the person.  Furthermore, honour a 
person’s dignity, treat and enjoy pleasure as a biproduct of a relationship.  Let the person be the 
source of enjoyment during both pleasurable and painful times, no matter who they are, what 
they’ve done, and regardless of what happens.  Seek the person as an ideal end in and of 
themselves.  The mentality that solely seeks pleasure is the end toward which Original Sin 
predisposes humanity, but where humans are concerned, the Christian-moral doctrine detailed in 
Love and Responsibility is the end that humans should work toward.  This is the end that will 
result in the realization of one’s full potential, the respect and honouring of God’s eternal plan, 
and of each person’s innate dignity, and in each person’s earthly – and eternal – fulfilment.  
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4: Mill’s Subjective- and JPII’s Objective-Moral Order 
From this analysis, and based on the specific excerpts examined in this section, we can 
argue that, on the one hand, Mill offers an objective moral philosophy rooted in happiness.  
Happiness is an inherently subjective standard, in that, to be measured, it relies on what an 
individual subjectively feels and desires, and how their subjective feelings and desires for 
happiness and minimal pain impact their response to their surroundings and behaviour toward 
others.  On the other hand, JPII offers an objective moral philosophy rooted in objectivity.  His 
moral code relies on the objective, elemental properties of the human person, or, who man is as 
an objective entity, and from this, how his own distinct nature and that of his fellow man impacts 
how he must relate and behave toward others.  To this he adds the flourish of Christian influence 
in asserting that all are equally and inherently dignified by way of being images of God. 
In simpler terms, Mill offers a moral code based on his belief that the person is a being 
who is driven to obtain happiness and to mitigate pain.  The key thing to remember here, 
therefore, is that Mill’s definition of a person’s purpose depends on what they do – “A test of 
right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and 
not a consequence of having already ascertained it.”166  In other words, what the human person 
does defines who the human person is, which in turn determines what they should do.  We see 
this expressed in Mill’s definition of the moral order: “[feeling happy and mitigating feeling 
pain], being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action [what a person does], 
is necessarily also the standard of morality [defines the moral standard and therefore humanity’s 
innate purpose]”; global adoption of this principle, whereby each work to ensure or mitigate 
others’ experience of certain feelings (which a person should do), will result in universal 
happiness.167  This principle can be distilled to “Happiness is the ultimate standard of morality 
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because working toward one’s own happiness is the most enjoyable, most convenient, most 
obvious thing for anyone to do – therefore, we must also work toward others’ happiness to 
ensure social harmony.”   
On the other hand, JPII offers a moral code not based on what a person does but based on 
their objective structure predating action.168  Therefore, who the human person is objectively – 
that is, a rational, objective creature, capable of self-determination, who is also made in God’s 
image, and therefore dignified – defines what a human person should do to unto them, that is, 
prize their dignity above feelings and a desire for pleasure and for pain’s mitigation.  This 
principle can be distilled to “The human person is objectively dignified.  Therefore, I must not 
decide my fellow man’s end for him – rather, I must give him what is her/his natural right, and 
treat her/him in a way that respects their personhood – their uniqueness, their unrepeatable 
nature, their distinctiveness, rationality, and objectivity, their interior life, their ability to 
determine their own ends.169  This, in accordance with Christian notions of self-sacrificial love, 
will support greater social harmony.” 
In terms of the order of the biological maturation of a human being, the physical, 
psychological (and spiritual) growth of the human person precedes a person’s ability to have 
motives or exhibit behaviours that dispose them toward the utilitarian attitude.  Chronologically 
and scientifically speaking, JPII’s argument for the objective moral order ‘pre-dates’ that of 
Mill’s, in that it first deals with the objective nature of man as opposed to the subjective feelings, 
desires, motivation, action, that springs forth from man, the objective being.  Therefore, on the 
one hand, Mill offers objective truth through a subjective lens, and on the other hand, JPII offers 
objective truth through an objective lens. 
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If I, the author, may venture make this assertion, in a modern Western context it is 
generally assumed that the more objective a moral standard, the higher the degree of truth to be 
found in it – the further removed a moral standard is from its objective root, the less truth there is 
to be found in it.  By this standard, it could be said that JPII’s moral order is further rooted in 
truth than Mill’s moral order, which is based on the subjective feelings and desires of an 
objective being.  Though one could argue that, on the one hand, JPII’s doctrine is subjective, in 
that, according to his Christian understanding, honouring the Second Commandment is not truly, 
fully possible without also honouring the First, on the other hand, his objective anthropology and 
psychology of the human person holds true regardless of his religious views; these are truths on 
which Love and Responsibility is founded, hence, there is a greater degree of objectivity to be 
found in it. 
JPII demonstrates this same mindset in the “Author’s Introduction to the First Polish 
Edition (1960)” of Love and Responsibility, where he states that proving the practical necessity 
of Christian principles and morality is one of the primary aims of his book:  
This book was born principally from the need to substantiate the norms of Catholic 
sexual ethics – and to do so as definitively as possible while appealing to the most 
elementary and undeniable moral truths and to the most fundamental values or 
goods.  Such a good is the person, and the moral truth most closely connected to the 
world of persons in particular is the “commandment to love” – for love is the good 
proper to the world of persons.  And therefore the most fundamental grasp of 
sexual morality is to grasp it on the basis of “love and responsibility” – hence the 
title of the whole book.170 
 
In this way, although JPII’s philosophy is undeniably and firmly grounded in Christianity, belief 
in God, and in a desire to fully honour the First and Second Commandments, a good deal of the 
logic he uses to prove their necessity is grounded in scientific fact on the nature of the human 
person.  This is how JPII substantiates the objectivity inherent at the foundation of these 
Christian principles.    
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Further evidence of this claim regarding the objective-objective lens through which JPII 
forms his ethics is found in the sequencing of his arguments.  By detailing the objective nature of 
the human person and presenting arguments in defence of a person’s right to respect, dignity, and 
self-determination before presenting his critique of utilitarianism, JPII undercuts the utilitarian 
argument.  This ordering’s potential implication is that the objective moral law cannot be 
deduced from nor subject to the inconsistent standards of humanity’s corruptible nature; rather, 
one must first address those objective properties that precede and exist outside of the corruptible 
mind to arrive at morally lucid conclusions.  This argument is echoed in JPII’s “Critique of 
Utilitarianism”, where he states that because pleasure is an elusive and therefore incalculable 
result of a concrete action, pleasure and the mitigation of pain not only cannot be but “[are] not 
the final criterion for [one’s] rational conduct.”171  Therefore, for JPII, in deducing the objective 
moral order, considerations for objective reality must precede those for subjective tastes and 
sensibilities. 
Mill holds a far different perspective.  Firstly, according to Utilitarianism, this issue of 
chronology would be negligible.  Utilitarianism is predicated on the belief that “[happiness and 
the mitigation of pain], being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is 
necessarily also the standard of morality”.172  Through this statement, another aspect of Mill’s 
morality comes to light – that good and evil only exist because sentient beings capable of 
experiencing consequences of their actions.  In this way, morality is dependent on sensory input, 
and how a person personally categorizes the positive or negative feelings they associate with this 
experience; as such, morality does not exist outside the realm of sentience.  Thus, morality only 
exists in the realm of the human consciousness and interaction, for all morality is subject to the 
feeling of happiness, and morality is only ever determined in relation to a consequence’s 
50 
happiness-inducing, pain-mitigating, or pain-inducing effect on another sentient being.  All 
moral considerations are subject to human feeling – feelings of pain, and feelings of pleasure. 
Mill also holds that his argument regarding objective truth, which is rooted in subjective 
standards, is a strength of his philosophy.  We must extrapolate from Utilitarianism to arrive at 
this conclusion.  The subjective standard is personal happiness.  Personal happiness is only 
attainable when one is given the liberty to pursue it.  Mill’s On Liberty expands on this idea 
when Mill states that, within reason, freedom to pursue all that one desires ensures society’s 
proper function –  
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our 
own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their 
efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, 
or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live 
as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the 
rest.173 
 
Thus, true freedom lies in individuality, obtaining the good one desires in whatever way it may 
be obtained without depriving or impeding others from theirs, and in doing so, causing them to 
meet an immoral end in harm, pain, loss of utility, unhappiness, etc.  Ensuring others’ pleasure, 
giving them what is justly, lawfully theirs, is the prime moral goal.174  This rule of law ensures 
society’s proper function.  This statement from On Liberty complements those at the close of 
Utilitarianism’s “Chapter 5. On the Connexion Between Justice and Utility” concerning the most 
basic requirement for just human conduct:  
The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in which we must never 
forget to include wrongful interference with each other's freedom) are more vital to 
human well-being than any maxims, however important, which only point out the 
best mode of managing some department of human affairs.175   
 
Freedom from harm, and freedom from impediment of one’s personal pursuits, is, therefore, 
Mill’s most basic requirement for just human conduct.   
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Let us now synergize both quotations to deduce Mill’s logic.  Freedom to pursue one’s 
own good, and freedom from pain and wrongful interference, are facets of justice.  Justice, being 
the most vital subset of social utility, is therefore the most important form of personal 
happiness.176  This notion of freedom is rooted in a doctrine of subjectivity, for each have their 
own personal versions of what causes them happiness and pain.  Infringing on a person’s moral 
right to subjective happiness is morally wrong because it infringes on a person’s social liberty.  
Therefore, Mill’s subjective standards regarding objective truth are a moral strength of his 
argument, in that they ensure personal liberty and thus society’s proper function.  In Mill’s case, 
and, contrary to JPII’s implied argument regarding the ascertainment of objective truth, the more 
subjective a moral standard, the higher the degree of objective truth to be found in it. 
This statement is supported by Mill biographer Jose Harris’ summary of key arguments 
presented in Mill’s A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive regarding the falsities of 
axiomatic truths.  Harris states: 
For Mill general propositions (other than those that were purely syllogistic) were 
deductions, themselves initially derived by inference from induction, without 
reference at any stage to categorical ideas.  The latter he portrayed as having 
throughout history seduced human minds into the error of believing that there were 
universal ‘substances’, over and above the sum of the specific cases which such 
categories were supposed to represent.  Substances were the sirens that lured 
unwary logicians to their doom, down false trails such as animism, mysticism, the 
Platonic theory of forms, linguistic and mathematical essentialism, the Christian 
doctrine of human nature … and the idealism of Kant.  … Even concepts relating to 
objects imperceptible in nature, such as perfect circles and lines without breadth, 
could ultimately be traced back, not to axiomatic truths, but to a mental process of 
neutralizing non-relevant sense-data.177 
 
Therefore, general propositions or axiomatic truths, like those of Kant’s and of Christianity, 
determined by “neutralizing non-relevant sense-data”, seduce human minds into believing 
falsities regarding the objective order of the universe.178  It could be argued that Mill would view 
JPII’s Love and Responsibility in the same light, for at the core of its teaching is a Christian 
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outlook which holds not only that Christ is “the Way, the Truth, and the Life”, “the Alpha and 
the Omega, the First and the Last, the Beginning and the End”, but also that “Christ [alone] sets 
us free”.179  These principles and assertions, for Mill, rely on mere induction to derive their 
‘truth’.  This quotation offers further evidence of Mill’s implicit argument – that objective truth 
rooted in the subjective standards of human happiness is, contrary to expectation, a strength of 
the utilitarian doctrine.  
In summary of this section, Mill offers an objective moral order rooted in the subjective 
standard of personal happiness.  What a person is inclined toward achieving (pleasure, freedom 
from pain), determines who the human person is and what the moral standard is, which in turn 
determines what a human person should do.  On the other hand, JPII offers an objective moral 
order rooted in objectivity (based on the fact that a human being is unique, unrepeatable, distinct, 
rational, possessing free will, and endowed with self-determination).  Therefore, who a human 
person is defines what they should do and how they should interact with others, this with the 
added influence of Christian teaching on the First and Second Commandment.  Mill considers 
the objective-subjective nature of his philosophy to be a strength, for subjective standards ensure 
that a person’s personal liberty is justly respected.  JPII considers the objective-objective nature 
of his philosophy to be a strength, for it ensures both God’s honouring and consistent respect for 
all people’s innate and equal dignity.  Thus, Mill believes that objective-objective standards – 
constant standards, general propositions and axiomatic truths – lead to false conclusions and 
society’s disintegration; JPII believes that objective-subjective standards – inconstant standards 
of that which constitutes pleasure and pain corrupted by fallen human nature – lead to false 
conclusions and harm of the human person.  
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5: Two Opposing Interpretations of the Commandment to Love 
Each philosopher’s conception of the Second Commandment, that is, the Commandment 
to Love, plays a pivotal role in distinguishing each philosophy.  As this essay’s introduction 
states, Mill equates love with pleasure.  Therefore, for Mill, the Commandment to Love is the 
Commandment to Pleasure.  To achieve an Edenic society – that is, greater social harmony – 
society must ensure the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people and as little pain for 
the least number as possible.  According to JPII’s logic, in marriage, specifically in marital 
intimacy, the utilitarian’s focus would be to maximize personal pleasure, and more importantly, 
to maximize one’s spouse’s personal pleasure.  Additionally (and as later discussed), this drive to 
pleasure-seek and to pain-mitigate is fundamentally motivated by fear of harm and pain.   
Conversely, JPII states that love and pleasure are completely separate entities.  For JPII 
(and for the Church), the Commandment to Love, which “demands love for persons”, is the 
Commandment to Self-Sacrifice.180  To achieve an Edenic society, one must affirm the innate 
dignity and worth of each human person.  This experience may involve a great amount of 
pleasure for the doer and the receiver of the (potential) action – it may also involve a great 
amount of pain.  In marriage, therefore, specifically in marital intimacy, the focus is to affirm 
one’s spouse’s dignity and worth by making the person the ultimate end of one’s action, and not 
pleasure, or pain’s negation.  Truly selfless acts are fundamentally motivated by a desire to serve 
and sacrifice for others, and to honour God by honouring others’ innate, God-imaging dignity. 
Mill’s address of the Commandment begins near the start of Chapter 2.  After writing on 
the meaning of utility, pleasure, happiness, moral rightness, pain, unhappiness, etc., Mill begins 
his religious appropriation of the Commandment to Love.  He leads with four critical 
conclusions.  Firstly, at reality’s most basic level, all experience results in either happiness or 
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unhappiness.  No mode of experience falls under any other category, for “pain is always 
heterogeneous with pleasure.”181  Nothing but happiness is desirable, for without it, each would 
seek their own demise.  Therefore, all things are accountable to Happiness theory.   
Secondly, reciprocity will result in universal happiness; in practice, this requires that each 
person nobly, affectionately, and benevolently works toward the majority’s happiness, without 
care for the personal benefits derive thereof.182  Mill anticipates that a concerted, consistent effort 
over several generations would endow all people with the greatest amount of happiness, the 
richest, highest pleasures, and the least pain – the full realization of a utilitarian society.183 
Thirdly, all actions must be oriented toward procuring happiness. Heroics and martyrdom 
– that is, losing one’s own life and happiness – to ensure both greater happiness for a greater 
number of persons, and that none thereafter will be subjected to the same pain, is the only noble 
end of such sacrifice.184  Sacrifices made for any other reason, namely for mere virtue, where 
none benefit from either greater happiness nor lesser pain, are wasted deeds better left undone – 
here, abstinence is perfectly moral.185  Virtuous sacrifices must be made for happiness’ sake.   
Fourthly, sacrificing one’s life for another to ensure their continued happiness is not only 
the most noble and virtuous of deeds, it is also a means of realizing the full extent of happiness – 
“I will add, that in this condition of the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, the conscious 
ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is 
attainable.”186  In this way, one must cultivate a happiness, a tranquility, that transcends every 
pain, and that can weather any storm.187  Those resilient individuals who “[resolve] to find 
happiness by the way rather than to make it a principal object” cultivate lasting contentment.188 
Therefore, pleasure and pain are the moral arbiters of all experience; secondly, 
generations of individuals willing to give without care for personal benefits reaped will result in 
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universal happiness; thirdly, to be of any use, virtuous sacrifices must be made for happiness’ 
sake, or for pain’s mitigation; fourthly, a willingness to sacrifice one’s own life and happiness 
for others cultivates lasting contentment.  These statements support Mill in adopting the 
Commandment to Love as the heart of utilitarianism; to be a true utilitarian, one must become 
strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.  In the golden rule of 
Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility.  To do as one 
would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal 
perfection of utilitarian morality.  As the means of making the nearest approach to 
this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place 
the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every 
individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and 
secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human 
character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an 
indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole.  
especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, 
negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes: so that not 
only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, 
consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse 
to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives 
of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent 
place in every human being's sentient existence.189 
 
Thus, to do unto others and to love as one loves one’s self in true, disinterested benevolence, 
each must be taught to equate their own happiness with others’ happiness.  This direct impulse 
will ensure that any attempt to make one’s self happy will, in effect, be an attempt to make others 
happy. 
Though subtle, Mill’s interpretation of the Commandment to Love is far different from 
JPII’s.  To pinpoint the differences inherent in each, one must first note Mill’s admission that his 
is “the nearest [possible] approach to this ideal” made through a utilitarian lens.  This technique 
of appropriation and alteration is further employed when Mill, in distinguishing between higher, 
intellectual pleasures and lower, sensory pleasures, states that such principle must be tempered 
with “many Stoic, as well as Christian elements”, to create sound moral teaching.190  Mill 
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biographer Jose Harris notes that such alterations “reflected [Mill’s general] goal of higher 
synthesis between conflicting doctrines”; his aim, therefore, was “not to subvert Christian belief 
but to strengthen [and ‘improve’] it, by offering the possibility of an alliance with ‘good ethics 
and good metaphysics’”, as in the case of Utilitarianism’s synthesis between Kantianism, 
utilitarianism, and the New Testament.191  His purpose, therefore, was not to entirely disprove 
nor wholly discredit Christianity, rather, to create one, holistic, objective moral order with which 
all humanity might agree and by which all might benefit. 
Mill continues to employ this technique in Utilitarianism, Chapter 3, when discussing 
external and internal sanctions.  The external sanctions that Mill affords utilitarianism are quite 
diverse.  As long as they align with utilitarianism’s core principles, external sanctions can be 
appropriated from any other belief system.192  These may include: belief in and love and awe of 
God, the desire to be rewarded, the fear of be punished and of suffering the eternal consequences 
of one’s immoral actions.193  With this, Mill reiterates that people desire both happiness and that 
others would confer happiness on them, regardless of moral or religious motivations or 
standards.194  In this way, though utilitarianism’s external sanctions can be appropriated from 
most any morality, one must always recall that a person’s innate desire to acquire happiness at all 
moral cost is, in truth, their top priority. 
Mill believes that the many external sanctions at utilitarian’s disposal are what makes it 
far superior to any other doctrine, for not only does it incorporate external sanctions approved by 
one man’s doctrine, it incorporates more – in fact, the most: thus, utilitarianism is more moral 
and advanced than any other doctrine, a claim with which the greatest number would agree 
(though a Christian of JPII’s persuasion would not be among this number).  That utilitarianism’s 
subscribers are self-honest about being motivated by happiness, whether that of their own, or of 
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others, further elevates the doctrine’s superiority.  In this way, all other doctrines are diluted in 
believing that they could act out of any primary motivation other than happiness.  Utilitarians are 
not deluded.  Thus, for a society working toward constant improvement and a truer 
understanding of the objective moral order, utilitarianism’s advanced external sanctions and 
honest nature make it the perfect moral doctrine for a truth-seeking, progressive society. 
Utilitarianism’s internal sanctions are much more complex.  These are embodied in a 
person’s disinterested sense of duty, which “is the essence of Conscience…derived from 
sympathy, from love, and still more from fear; from all the forms of religious feeling; from the 
recollections of childhood and of all our past life; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of 
others, and occasionally even self-abasement.”195  In this way, Mill reminds his audience that the 
seemingly mystical and “mysterious law[s]” of the conscience are merely a product of the human 
mind and experience, and that these internal sanctions are responsible for one’s sense of moral 
obligation.196  To resist their influence is no small feat, for it involves trespassing on “a mass of 
[personal] feeling”, an act usually followed by regret.197   
Summarizing, Mill refutes the notion of conscience as a supernatural moral compass, 
attributing one’s sense of disinterested moral duty to a mere product of feeling, memory, ethical 
teachings, self-adulation and self-deprecation, and a desire to be liked by others.  In doing so, 
Mill advances his argument that there exists no more righteous and scientific moral doctrine than 
utilitarianism – those moral orders that place a large emphasis on the supposed mystical, morally 
righteous influence of conscience on their actions are diluted, thus their principles arbitrary.  To 
achieve true understanding, humanity must accept that happiness and the mitigation of pain, 
whether for oneself or for others, are the only true motives of human conduct. 
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From this, Mill asserts that because conscience, the ultimate sanction of morality, is 
merely subjective feeling, it follows that all moral codes are equal, for their ultimate sanctions 
are, of course, to do right by one’s fellow man.198  This feeling is universal – although some 
subscribe only to external sanctions, Mill concludes that it is equally possible to form a strong 
‘conscience’ through utilitarianism as with any other moral doctrine.199  Therefore, conscience, 
being a subjective feeling, is amenable to any moral code, including utilitarianism. 
Building on the preceding arguments, Mill states that “the [utilitarian’s] sanction of that 
particular standard […] is the same as of all other moral standards—the conscientious feelings of 
mankind”, thus reasserting his belief that all moral standards are equal.200  For in asserting that 
“morality of any kind has no hold but through the external sanctions”, and that all internal moral 
feeling is a product of experience, Mill places all morality on a level plain, that is, on the plain of 
seeking utility, thus rendering all moral doctrines equally effective.201  
These conclusions, in addition to Mill’s synergizing of Christianity, personalism, and 
hedonistic utilitarianism, will appear insidious to those believing their religion to hold objective 
truth, and to those who agree with JPII that personalism and hedonism are incompatible.  For 
Mill, however, his aim is not to deceive readers, but to free them from an oppressive morality 
that lacks transparency and proper cohesion between principle and human action.  By exposing 
the first principle of all human action – that all act to achieve happiness, therefore, happiness is 
moral – Mill aims to effect self-honesty in his readers, and to free them of the unnecessary guilt 
and remorse that stop them from examining their underlying inclinations and intentions toward 
happiness.  Simply put, Mill hopes to reform those poorly formed, poorly educated, ignorant 
consciences of his readers (though not necessarily willfully ignorant). 
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 This insight is crucial.  It would be easy to say from a strictly stoic viewpoint that Mill is 
attempting to pervert the Christian doctrine, much as do utilitarian’s detractors, as Mill mentions 
“Chapter 1: General Remarks”.  Even if Mill’s appropriation of the Commandment were a 
purposefully devious, outright distortion, however, it would do readers well to refrain from 
approaching Mill’s work with this mindset, for the purpose of this paper is to help readers 
understand each philosopher from their own standpoint.  To understand Mill’s meaning from a 
perspective other than as a distortion of Christian teaching, it must again be emphasized that his 
desire is to strengthen and improve Christianity – not merely for his own private purpose, but, as 
his philosophy attests, for the betterment of society and for the good of humankind.202  Thus, in 
Mill’s view, this expression of the Commandment is not exactly an alteration or a perversion of 
Christian teaching; rather, it constitutes the real truth of Christian teaching according to a 
utilitarian’s understanding of the objective moral order, and or the strengthening of Christian 
teaching, purer and truer in its realization of life’s natural moral standard, all for the betterment 
of society.   
Without a proper understanding of the truly Christian meaning of the word love, and in 
lieu of Mill’s willingness to incorporate as many internal and external sanctions from how every 
many doctrines into utilitarianism to ensure society’s proper function, it would be easy to 
question how Mill’s personal iteration of the Commandment could ever constitute a distortion of 
Christianity.  Indeed, by Mill’s own admission, it appears that he harbours a great respect for 
Christianity’s moral principles, and for all doctrines’ moral principles.  In this way, one might be 
prompted to ask – is not Mill advocating for the kind of benevolent love that JPII claims is 
inherent in the philosophy of Love and Responsibility?  Is this not the same love that Jesus 
commands of his followers?  
60 
The difference between Mill’s utilitarian-Christian hybrid and Christianity’s version of 
the Commandment is complex.  To those of Mill’s persuasion, the truth of this difference may 
seem trivial.  To those of JPII’s persuasion, this difference makes all the difference. 
The most crucial insight to be derived from Mill’s version of the Commandment is his 
equating love with happiness.  For Mill, love is equal to pleasure, and love can only cause 
pleasure.  Moreover, love cannot equal pain, and love cannot cause pain – for “pain is always 
heterogeneous with pleasure.”203  Lastly, given that the means or conduit to happiness are also 
good, and, given that happiness and unhappiness are opposed, it follows that pain cannot lead to 
happiness, and that pleasure cannot lead to unhappiness.  To put it another way, pain cannot lead 
to love, and love cannot lead to pain.  Love, happiness, pleasure, utility, use, goodness – these 
are morally right.  Anything other than these, and anything that leads to ends opposite to these, is 
a moral wrong.  Summarizing, love – that is, pleasure, happiness, utility – is both opposite to and 
cannot in any way involve pain and unhappiness.204  According to Mill, love is happiness. 
This analysis would not be complete without Mill’s adamant addition that the most 
perfect application of the utilitarian doctrine requires that all subscribers equate their own 
personal happiness with the happiness of the whole.205  This call, Mill argues, is stoked by 
humanity’s natural desire for community.  He states – by nature of existing in a society, people 
are conditioned to consider themselves as “a member of a body” – the outgrowth being that 
people depend on and “desire to be in unity with [their] fellow creatures”.  This “social state is at 
once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances 
or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member 
of a body”.206  From this conclusion emanates another – because society is both naturally 
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desirable and desirable because of social conditioning, people begin to regard others’ interests as 
something to which they should attend:  
Society between equals can only exist on the understanding that the interests of all 
are to be regarded equally. … In this way people grow up unable to conceive as 
possible to them a state of total disregard of other people's interests. … He comes, as 
though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a being who of course pays regard 
to others.207   
 
Thus, humans are motivated to act in the interest of others because they are socially 
conditioned toward valuing community by virtue of the fact that they live in community.  
With the right sort of education, a natural, binding feeling of social sympathy, which 
constitutes a benevolent sort of care for supporting others’ interests, begins to develop.208 
From these conclusions, Mill asserts that to be the truest, most morally righteous 
utilitarian, to truly love, to truly achieve happiness, pleasure, and utility, is to help the greater 
good achieve greater happiness.  Simply put, happiness is achieved by helping others.  In this 
way, for Mill, the Commandment to Love translates to either “Pleasure and ensure the happiness 
of your neighbour in the same way that you ensure pleasure or happiness for yourself”, or 
“Pleasure and ensure the happiness of your neighbour to the same degree that you ensure 
pleasure or happiness for yourself” (the former variant meaning that you pleasure your neighbour 
according to your personal subjective tastes, the latter meaning that you pleasure your neighbour 
to the same degree that you pleasure yourself and according to their subjective tastes.  Both 
iterations have been included, for it is unclear which iteration Mill intends).  Other probable 
iterations of this principle include: “Ensure that the least harm and pain come to your neighbour 
as you do for yourself”, “Your happiness is your neighbour’s happiness”, and “There is no 
greater happiness [says the Lord] than to ensure the happiness of your neighbour”, or “to lay 
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down your happiness in the interest of your neighbour’s happiness.”  Such is the mindset of the 
truest, most noble, righteous, benevolent, disinterested, and affectionate utilitarian. 
With Mill’s iteration of the creed comes both provisions and evidence substantiating its 
effectiveness and validity, each of which either build on or run entirely contrary to Christian 
teaching.  Firstly, though it is everyone’s moral and social Duty to exhibit disinterested, 
benevolent, ‘Christ-like’ actions toward others in accordance with the Commandment, an 
action’s motivation – which is a separate concern entirely – does not impact an action’s moral 
quality, and can therefore stem from entirely separate interests.209  Secondly, for the average 
person, responsibility for the happiness of the whole refers only to those living in one’s 
immediate community; that said, immoral acts are those that, if generally practiced, would harm 
society at large (the wider community) – otherwise, “private utility, the interest or happiness of 
some few persons, is all [one] has to attend to.”210 
Thirdly, contrary to the flawed understanding of Christianity’s followers, it is entirely 
defensible to postulate that God reveals his divine plan through utilitarianism, or through any 
other moral doctrine really, given that God wants his creation to be happy – whether or not this is 
actually the case, however, Mill states that such questions are “superfluous here to discuss; since 
whatever aid religion, either natural or revealed, can afford to ethical investigation, is as open to 
the utilitarian moralist as to any other.”211  Fourth and final, whether through use of first or 
second principles, the utilitarian’s efforts to calculate the potential happy (loving, pleasurable, 
useful, morally righteous) or unhappy (hateful, painful, useless, morally problematic) 
consequences of an action are as entirely practical and instinctive as for Christians to judge their 
actions by Biblical law without directly referencing scripture.212  In this way, Mill hypothesizes 
that God’s plan is open to interpretation, and that all religious or philosophical roads, as long as 
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they adhere to the happiness morality, have the potential to lead to God.  Therefore, an action’s 
motivation holds no moral value, the greater good refers to one’s immediate community, God (if 
he exists) may reveal his divine plan through utilitarianism, and anticipating the pleasure or pain 
of an action by way of calculations is entirely practical. 
JPII’s perspective on this Christian principle is quite opposite to Mill’s and is clearly a 
direct address to what Christians would consider a misunderstanding of the Commandment. 
To begin, for a Christian, the moral worth or quality of a person, thing, experience, least 
of all the sacrifices of heroes and martyrs who lay down their life, for example, for the sake of 
Christian teaching, are not accountable to pleasure and to pain’s mitigation.  Secondly, JPII’s 
philosophy is not limited to one’s immediate community, rather, the dignity of each human 
person and the moral code he establishes thereof extends to all persons everywhere.  Thirdly, 
while Christians believe that self-giving free of expectation of reciprocation is core to Christian 
teaching, Christians do not believe that this sustained, concerted effort on the part of humans will 
result in an earthly paradise, for sin and Original sin cannot be overcome without the redeeming 
power of Christ, his suffering on the cross, and his Second Coming (more on this in Part 8: 
Impact of Mill’s Agnosticism and JPII’s Christianity).  Lastly, the assertion that self-sacrifice 
and a willingness to do without happiness cultivates lasting contentment does not altogether run 
contrary to Christian teaching. 
Before introducing the differences between Mill’s iteration of the Commandment and its 
original Christian meaning, JPII differentiates between love and use (that is, treating a person as 
a mere means to a pleasurable end); he states: love has the power to remedy mere mutual use in 
human relationships.213  When freely chosen by its participants, love purifies intention, prevents 
obstruction of a person’s dignity, unites people in action from within, makes equal its 
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participants, and strives toward a common and honourable end.214  The phrase freely chosen is 
key, for as JPII states, love “is not something readily available.  Love is [firstly] a principle or an 
idea” which, in being freely chosen and acted on by its participants, “liberate[s] it from a [using,] 
utilitarian, i.e., consumer…attitude toward other persons”.215   
This conscious focus on the common good, where each person subordinates themselves 
and orients their actions toward an honourable common end, “gradually eliminate[s]” the 
possibility of use.216  Because common goods transcend the subjective reality of pleasure and of 
happiness, when this “objective common good” or objective reality is discovered, love – “a 
union of persons” – becomes possible.217  In marriage, therefore, the common end conjugal 
intercourse is “procreation, progeny, the family” and spousal relationship maturation.218  With 
this, JPII adds that this end, though benevolent, is not solely capable of preventing mere use – to 
further negate this possibility, the role must suit the relationship, and, again, spouses must have 
children, family, the strengthening of their spousal relationship as their common end.   
In simple terms – do not enter marriage to derive pleasure from the union.  Do not enter 
society expecting to be pleased.  Have community, family, the strengthening of relationships, the 
affirmation of the dignity of the person, as your goal.  This choice may or may not result in a 
happy feeling – this, however, is not the purpose for which one acts.  Rather, one must act 
lovingly regardless of pleasant or unpleasant feelings caused by or experienced as a result of 
these actions.  Simply put, focus on the fully dignified person worthy of your attention, not the 
feelings that accompany this focus.  Allow the person to determine their own end, and therefore 
to consent to a common end with you, an end in the interest of affirming your relationship, and, 
in creating a wholesome, strong community (family) of persons. 
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From here, JPII introduces Christian views on the Commandment to Love, Mill-type 
misunderstandings of the Commandment, and how this Commandment interacts with the 
personalistic norm.  JPII states: The Commandment to Love “demands love for persons[, not 
pleasant feelings].  For God, [who is Love, and] who the commandment to love names in the first 
place, is the most perfect personal Being.”219  He continues: persons are Love’s most dignified 
creatures because they are made in Love’s image.  (Hedonistic) utilitarianism choses to image 
use, which is unable to love, specifically, transcending subjective mutual, pleasurable use toward 
an objective common good between two persons.  Where happiness is an inherently isolated 
experience, love is a community of persons.  Therefore, because the human person is created by 
Love and for Love, humans oppose their truest nature by choosing to use others or to be used; 
moreover, without love, it becomes impossible to be united with God and fellow man and to 
achieve greater social harmony.  As inability to be truly unified to one’s fellow man is, for JPII, a 
true travesty, for human beings are made for community.  Thus, according to the personalistic 
norm – “the person is a kind of good to which only love constitutes the proper and fully-mature 
relation.”220 
Clearly, JPII’s Christian ethics starkly contrast those of Mill’s.  For while Mill aims to 
unite humankind through Happiness Theory and an altered version of the Commandment, JPII 
undercuts his methodology by stating that the principle of utility requires use of persons, which 
is not only harmful to them, but also obstructs their ability to define their own end and therefore 
obstructs their dignity.  In JPII’s view, therefore, Mill’s aim is undone by his own core principle. 
From here, JPII briefly addresses the difference between the Commandment to Love, and 
the personalistic norm, which treats the human person as an end in and of themselves.221  Strictly 
speaking, he states, the Commandment originates from the norm, as in the case of a secondary 
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principle emanating from the first.222  Utilitarianism’s first principle does not align with the 
personalistic norm, for the person’s value, which “is incompatible with using”, transcends 
pleasure’s value – “therefore the person cannot be subordinated to pleasure; he cannot serve as a 
means to the end which is pleasure”.223  Generally speaking, however, the norm and the 
Commandment can be viewed as synonymous, in that the second is supported by and falls under 
the first, and, both call for love of persons.224  Because the personalistic norm supports the 
Commandment, both can be viewed as separate and or the same principle(s) – therefore, for JPII, 
neither the Commandment, personalistic ethics, love, nor the fostering of true community are 
compatible with the utilitarian mentality.225  In this way, where Mill hastily exists a discussion 
regarding God’s apparent choice to reveal himself through the utilitarian doctrine, deeming it 
“superfluous … to discuss”, arguing that God’s plan is open to interpretation, and that all 
religious or philosophical roads, as long as they adhere to the happiness morality, have the 
potential to lead to God, JPII argues quite opposite, and makes a strong point of reproving Mill’s 
claim.226 Therefore, for JPII, God cannot reveal his divine plan through utilitarianism. 
To further demonstrate why JPII holds the utilitarian and Christian view of the 
Commandment as opposing, it is helpful to reference 1 Corinthians Chapter 13’s practical 
definition of love, self-giving, honouring a person, and allowing them to choose their own end 
without force.  This excerpt demonstrates Christianity’s core teaching that love requires effort: 
Love is patient, love is kind.  It is not jealous, [love] is not pompous, it is not 
inflated, it is not rude, it does not seek its own interests, it is not quick-tempered, it 
does not brood over injury, it does not rejoice over wrongdoing but rejoices with 
the truth.  It bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things.  
Love never fails.227 
 
In the context of this analysis regarding love between persons, patience requires that a person 
prioritizes the schedule and immediate needs of another over their own.  Kindness requires a 
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giving and welcoming approach to others.  To refrain from jealousy requires curbing one’s desire 
to obtain what is not one’s own and to rejoice in the gifts that are bestowed on others.  To refrain 
from pride is to choose to be humble. Etcetera, etcetera.  Each of these requirements of love 
involve choice, action, effort beyond impulse, effort toward self-giving – giving of time, of 
friendship, giving up pride, inclinations toward unkind comments, forgiving, and so forth.  
This Christian view of love – that is, love as action, as opposed to love as a feeling – 
contrasts very strongly with Mill’s utilitarian-Christian synthesis of love, as demonstrated in the 
below, edited version of love’s definition, per the utilitarian mentality: 
Pleasure is patient, pleasure is kind.  It is not jealous, [pleasure] is not pompous, it 
is not inflated, it is not rude, [pleasure] does not seek its own interests, it is not 
quick-tempered, it does not brood over injury, it does not rejoice over wrongdoing 
but rejoices with the truth.  [Pleasure] bears all things, believes all things, hopes all 
things, endures all things.  Pleasure never fails.228 
 
One might interchange the word love with utility or use as well, given that, as previously 
established, each of these words are, for Mill, synonymous.  With this practical example, 
from a Christian standpoint, this analysis conveys even more strongly that love and 
pleasure are not synonyms as Mill attests, for pleasure and happiness are feelings, whereas 
love is action, action that prioritizes another’s needs and dignity above one’s own. 
Therefore, according to the Commandment’s original intent, love is not a pleasant feeling 
of happiness, nor is it an experience of pleasure or an instance where utility is gained.  Moreover, 
while true love is always moral, one can be happy while experiencing pleasure and still be in sin.  
In other terms, it is possible to be happy while engaging in immoral conduct.  Love, therefore, is 
a choice.  A choice to love someone, a concrete being, not to experience something, an emotion, 
that will fade with a passing moment – “[a]fter all, the sexual value somewhat imposes itself, 
whereas the value of the person awaits affirmation and choice.”229  This act of love is meant to 
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endure in both one’s immediate and extended community during both pleasurable and painful 
times, in happiness and unhappiness.  In other words, love and bless one another in good times 
and in bad, in sickness and in health; love and honour the person (not the experience, but the 
human being, in all their innate, God-imaging dignity), all the days of their life, even if they are 
an enemy, because their value always outweighs the pleasure or pain of an experience.230   
It must be further stated that, for JPII, a utilitarian’s desire to make “an indissoluble 
association between [a person’s] own happiness and the good of the whole” does not result in a 
doer’s true disinterestedness or benevolence.231  In this case, the only reason that one would be 
motivated to work for the good of others is because it results in one’s own happiness.232  In light 
of JPII’s logic, this is why a Mill-type iteration of the Commandment to Love would likely 
appear as “Pleasure and ensure the happiness of your neighbour in the same subjective way that 
you ensure pleasure or happiness for yourself”, as opposed to “Pleasure and ensure the happiness 
of your neighbour to the same degree that you ensure pleasure or happiness for yourself”.  In this 
way, a person of a Mill-type ethical persuasion is still focused on their personal happiness, and 
not on the happiness of others.233  Volunteering to help others merely becomes a means for the 
doer to achieve personal happiness.234  This, from a Christian perspective, constitutes “doing the 
right thing for the wrong reasons” – here, the disposition of the heart, that which motivates the 
action, makes all the moral difference.235   
In summary of Part 5, Mill argues that, to achieve an Edenic society on a macrocosmic 
scale, people must live by a variant the Biblical Commandment to Love, strengthened by 
utilitarianism, within their immediate communities.  Given that pleasure and pain are the arbiters 
of that which constitutes the moral quality of a consequence, and that, in truth, all people seek 
utility despite the attestations of the philosophies to which they subscribe, the production of an 
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Edenic society requires that people be educated to equate their happiness with that of others, and 
that each thereby engage in calculated, benevolent self-giving made for the sake of others’ 
happiness.  Mill holds that human disposition toward this ethical orientation is achievable for 
two reasons.  Firstly, the fact that humans live in a society naturally inclines them toward valuing 
society.  To keep this society intact, Mill argues that because conscience is a subjective feeling 
produced by feeling, memory, ethics, self-adulation and -depreciation, as well as a desire to be 
liked, instead of being a supernatural, sixth sense of that which is morally right and wrong, it is 
therefore amenable to any moral code, including utilitarianism.  Therefore, secondly, accepting 
and living by the utilitarian’s objective core principle that all actions are accountable to 
Happiness theory, will result in universal happiness.  Most importantly, Mill argues that it is 
entirely possible for God (if he exists) to reveal his divine plan through utilitarianism. 
On the other hand, JPII argues that love, above all, is “a principle or an idea” which must 
be freely chosen and acted on by its participants.236  This action “liberate[s] it from a [using,] 
utilitarian, i.e., consumer…attitude toward other persons”, for it is known that it is possible to 
experience pleasure and happiness while engaging in immoral conduct.237  He also argues that 
God is Love; according to Genesis, because humans are made in the image and likeness of Love, 
people therefore achieve their full potential precisely by loving – that is, by making a gift of 
themselves to others, allowing others to determine their own end, not merely using them for the 
sake of pleasure or pain’s mitigation.  Such self-gift brings human closer to an earthly experience 
of unity between themselves, God, and fellow man.  Practically speaking, in marriage – the 
microcosmic expression of society – and in the act of conjugal intercourse, love requires that 
man and woman have the same common end – “procreation, progeny, the family” and spousal 
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relationship maturation.238  To be truly benevolent, the role that each take on in this realization 
of love must suit the couple’s relationship. 
With this, JPII also holds that because the personalistic norm and the Christian iteration 
of Commandment (where love opposes use) can be viewed as synonymous, there is no way that 
hedonistic utilitarianism and personalistic ethics are compatible. This, demonstrated through 1 
Corinthians Chapter 13’s practical definition of love, reveals that according to Christian 
teaching, and just as JPII attests, love is not a feeling, rather, it requires choice, action, effort 
beyond impulse, effort toward self-giving, during both pleasant and painful times.  Thus, the 
doer may or may not benefit from their own actions, and they may or may not achieve a pleasant 
experience from their interaction with another person, but this, however, is not the goal.  The 
goal is to affirm and love the person with whom another is in relationship regardless of personal 
benefit.  Therefore, JPII further asserts that equating one’s personal happiness with society’s 
good will not result in sustainable benevolence, for this means that one is motivated to work for 
the good of others because of the utility they gain in return.  Thus, the position of the heart, that 
is, the motivation behind an action and consequence, makes all the moral difference. 
Therefore, utilitarianism’s first principle (according to Utilitarianism), is ensuring 
the experience of pleasure and preventing the experience of pain, whereas the (Second) 
Commandment to Love, according to Love and Responsibility, is honouring a person, who 
possesses innate dignity and worth.  For Mill, the standard of utmost ethical perfection is 
the degree to which one has bestowed pleasure, happiness on, and helped to mitigate pain 
and unhappiness for other people.  For JPII, the standard of ethical perfection with respect 
to the Second Commandment is the degree to which one has emptied themselves to serve 
others by dying to their personal concerns for happiness.  
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6: Constants and Inconstants, Addition and Subtraction 
Another way to characterize the difference between JPII’s objective-objective moral 
standard and Mill’s objective-subjective moral standard is using mathematical notions of 
constant and inconstant variables, as well as addition and subtraction.  For Mill, this 
characterization is wholly appropriate, given that both Mill and the utilitarian doctrine have a 
decidedly mathematical bent, with a focus on calculating utility.239  As Harris also notes, “[t]he 
revised editions of the Principles suggest that over time Mill became less interested in economics 
as an abstract science, and more interested in its prescriptive use as a tool of civic morality and 
social policy” – the same economic orientation can be said of Mill’s Utilitarianism.  While JPII 
makes it abundantly clear that true abiding, self-sacrificial love cannot be reduced to mere 
calculation, and that the utilitarian’s aim to calculate the elusive pleasurable and painful 
outcomes of an action is impractical, these characterizations are still somewhat helpful here in 
distinguishing between each philosophy.240  Note that the following paragraphs include general 
observations exclusive of negative or positive connotations.  
The constant variable (or value) in Mill’s equation is pleasure (and avoidance of pain).241  
Each of these variables are experiences.  By nature, however, the experience of pleasure is 
inconstant – varied, fluid, and ever-changing, for as Mill states, pleasure exists in a rich and 
varied hierarchy impacted by quality and quantity.242  Calculations and intense reasoning are 
required because each experience of pleasure is, naturally, different.  What is required of man to 
obtain the maximum amount of pleasure will vary each time.  Moreover, how each person 
experiences pleasure, and what each person deems to be pleasurable, are also varied. 
After establishing this unmistakable connection, however, Mill moves to 
destabilize traditional notions of the justice in response to claims that utility, being a 
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subjective, uncertain standard, has no business distinguishing moral from immoral 
conduct.  He states: one might hope that because utility is an inconstant and unpredictable 
variable (subject to each person’s subjective tastes and sensibilities), constancy and 
predictability – that is, safety – could be found “in the immutable, ineffaceable, and 
unmistakeable dictates of Justice.”243  This, Mill states, is untrue, for these principles of 
justice not only vary from nation to nation, and from individual to individual – in these, 
there also exist contradictions, emanating from personal bias or intersecting standards.244  
In this way, justice is as inconstant and subjective in its measurements as is utility – thus, 
justice and utility are indeed interconnected, with justice relying on utility for its full force. 
Mill’s views on justice and its relation to utility further prove the assertion that Mill’s 
constant variable is, by nature, inconstant.  As previously established with the inclusion of 
excerpts from On Liberty, using inconstant standards of justice and of utility to form the 
objective moral order counteracts and prevents social oppression and the tyranny of uniform 
public opinion, which has the potential to drown out individuality and freedom.245  Mill seeks to 
keep human uniqueness and personal freedom intact to ensure humanity’s safety.246 
The constant variable or value in JPII’s equation is the innate dignity and worth of the 
person; this dignity is not situationally dependent, nor is it dependent on one’s willingness to 
affirm another, the quality of an experience, the degree to which one is able to please another’s 
personal tastes, nor on a person’s intelligence or particular usefulness – it is never-changing, 
ever-present, innate, and irrefutably objective through and through, and deserving of respect at 
all times.247  In the context of marriage, family, and marital love, pleasure and utility must, above 
all, be fully justified by self-giving love, that is, spousal love.248  In other words, the person must 
be prioritized above a desire for pleasure or for pain’s mitigation, for fulfilling this desire does 
73 
not necessarily affirm or honour their innate dignity; as JPII states, “[f]or it is know that 
sometimes what is truly good, what morality and conscience command me, is accompanied 
precisely some pain and demands forgoing pleasure.”249  In contrast to the logic supporting 
Mill’s subjectively rooted, inconstant standards for the moral order, JPII holds that self-
sacrificial love of others, respect for their rational, their individuality, their freedom to choose 
their own end, etcetera., negate the effects of social tyranny.250  In this way, JPII’s constant value 
is itself constant – pleasure, and inconstant value, must be subject to the highest good, that is, the 
‘constant’ dignity of the person, in JPII’s objective equation for the moral order.  
The concepts of addition and subtraction also play a role in each philosophy.  Mill’s 
focus is on addition and fulfilment – addition of happiness to oneself and to one’s community, 
while also the subtraction of (freedom from) pain.  He states: “men's sentiments, both of favour 
and of aversion, are greatly influenced by what they suppose to be the effects of things upon their 
happiness” – in this way, “[a]ccording to the Greatest Happiness Principle … the ultimate end … 
is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in 
point of quantity and quality”.251   
JPII’s focus is the reverse – subtraction.  To fully substantiate this claim, we must look to 
“Chapter II, The Person and Love – Part One: Metaphysical Analysis of Love”, subheading 
“Spousal Love” of Love and Responsibility, where JPII summarizes the heart of the Christian 
teaching in quoting Matthew Chapter 10, verse 39: 
[T]he person can give himself to another person, both to a human person and to 
God, and through this giving a particular shape of love, which we define as spousal 
love, is formed.  …  Christ expressed this in the sentence that seems to contain a 
deep paradox: “Whoever wants to save his soul will lose it, and whoever loses his 
soul for my sake will find it” (Mt 10:39).252 
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This same sentiment regarding spousal love, laying down one’s life for another, or, in the 
vein of John 3:30, decreasing so that another may increase, is echoed in “Chapter III, The 
Person and Chastity – Part One: Rehabilitation of Chastity”, subheading, “Subjectivism 
and egoism”.  Here, JPII states that pleasure is a good, but that when “the disposition of the 
will [is ordered] toward pleasure alone”, it becomes a moral evil.253 Ignatik further states 
that (conjugal) pleasure elevated and sought above the person results in an egoism, only to 
be corrected by self-giving to the point of dying to oneself.254 
… [T]his egoism not only injures the person-object of love by reducing him to the 
role of a means to an end, but also impedes the attainment of the fullness of 
happiness for the subject of action.  For man attains happiness through self-giving 
proper to the person, self-giving in love up to the point of losing oneself (see the 
evangelical “Unless a grain of wheat dies, it remains just a grain of wheat; but if it 
dies, it produces much fruit”). … For this reason, it is morally reprehensible not 
only to subordinate other people to one’s striving for pleasure, but also to seek a 
good for another person that does not take into account the dignity of the person.255 
 
Simply put, the end of the conjugal act is the person; the person is separate from the ‘mood-
feeling’ that accompanies the experience.  This mood feeling – a fruit of affirming the person 
through conjugal love – is pleasure.  This fruit, happiness, must be treated as collateral, 
accidental properties of the action, for the priority must be to affirm the person through pure 
self-giving – dying to one’s own personal tastes, enjoyments, etcetera. to love another.256  Thus, 
the focus of JPII’s doctrine is subtraction, decreasing, so that others might increase. 
It could be said that Mill’s focus is also subtraction, for in Chapter 2 of Utilitarianism, 
Mill adopts the Commandment to Love as the heart of utilitarianism – “To do as one would be 
done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian 
morality.”257  In this way, to be a true utilitarian, and to achieve an Edenic, utilitarian world, 
humanity must be noble, and seek others’ happiness.258  Though the very nature of Christ’s 
Commandment is self-gift, it must also be stated that, for Mill, the baseline consideration for the 
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unempathetic utilitarianism is self-protection.  As outlined in Utilitarianism, Chapter 5 regarding 
justice, the most important facet of utility, Mill states that “[t]he moral rules which forbid 
mankind to hurt one another … ([including] wrongful interference with each other’s freedom) 
are more vital to human well-being [and humanity’s sense of community] than any maxims”.259  
In this way, the focus of Mill’s ethical doctrine becomes less about preventing harm to another 
person and more about preventing harm to oneself, or, prioritizing the needs of oneself above 
those of others, which is quite opposite to the heart of Christian teaching. 
By merely giving to each other prudential instruction or exhortation, they may 
gain, or think they gain, nothing: in inculcating on each other the duty of 
positive beneficence they have an unmistakeable interest, but far less in degree: 
a person may possibly not need the benefits of others; but he always needs that 
they should not do him hurt.260 
 
In this way, a person might not be beneficently motivated to act in others’ interest, but 
when they consider the personal impact of their unwillingness to protect others, they are 
motivated to reconsider their self-serving position.  In this way, Mill affords that 
utilitarianism’s least noble though most basic motivation is as follows: “I take what I need.  
I will only obey the maxim not to harm you because then you will not harm me in return.  
The only reason I do not harm you is so that I may live peacefully.”  (This begs an 
extraneous but nonetheless important question – if one has enough money and resources to 
live peacefully while still harming others, would said person choose to harm others)? 
This caveat colours how readers perceive Mill’s statements from Chapter 2 
regarding the Commandment.  As previously noted, this quotation demonstrates that, for 
Mill, the negation of pain outweighs the assurance of pleasure, for “[a person] always 
needs that [others] should not do him hurt.”261  Though Mill’s eventual hope is that people 
will be taught to equate their own happiness with that of the whole, the threat of violence 
76 
and self-protection is the most basic reason that motivates selfish individuals to act 
selflessly (whereas for JPII, the value that a person possesses independent of how danger, 
harm, and pain affect the actor).262  At its most basic level, Mill’s philosophy is indeed 
grounded in addition – that is, in Christian terms, addition to one’s own life so that one 
might live.  “Thus, at most one can want the other’s pleasure ‘next’ to his own pleasure; 
but always only ‘on condition’ of one’s own pleasure.”263  Self-security, therefore, 
becomes the indispensable moral necessity of greater value than common utility.264 
In conclusion, in terms of constant and inconstant standards, Mill’s objective moral order 
is based on inconstant standards of subjective notions of pleasure, pain, and justice, this to 
counteract the effects of uniform principles tyrannizing free thought and personal liberty.  On the 
other hand, JPII’s objective moral order is based on constant standards of the objectively 
dignified nature of the human person, this to counteract the negative effects of reducing the 
human person to a mere means to a useful and pleasurable end.  In terms of addition and 
subtraction, Utilitarianism’s most basic focus is addition – addition to happiness, and subtraction 
of unhappiness.  The baseline consideration, however, is giving to receive, that is, adding to 
one’s personal security.  For JPII, the focus is subtraction, not simply giving for the sake of 
giving, rather, giving because it is a person’s (Godly) nature to give without the ulterior motive 
to enhance personal security.  Therefore, man must give (decrease) – not to receive (increase), 
even though he will find himself fulfilled – because it is his inborn purpose.  Man fulfills his 
objective purpose by giving, dying to himself and to his own security to give life to others 
without expectation of return.  In sum, Mill uses inconstant standards and mathematical notions 
of (primarily) addition to build his objective-subjective moral order, whereas JPII uses constant 
standards and mathematical notions of subtraction to build his objective-objective moral order.  
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7: Mill and JPII’s Seeming Self-Contradictions 
It would be easy to leave our comparison of these two texts at that – but further reading 
into the talks and the additional works of each philosopher provide a seemingly strange and 
incongruous similarity between each philosophy that is critical here to discuss, and it would do 
neither text full justice if this similarity were not addressed and analyzed. 
To begin, Mill’s Autobiography compounds the difficulty in distinguishing between Mill 
and JPII’s core arguments.  At the close of his mental crisis during young adulthood, Mill came 
to an important conclusion about human relationships, one which mirrors some of JPII’s own 
arguments.  Before Mill’s epiphany, personal happiness was his primary object.  Once he 
discovered that his current state and occupation in life were not resulting in his personal 
happiness, however, he fell into a deep depression.265  His mental anguish was relieved once he 
realized that happiness must be achieved “by the way”.  Mill states: 
I never, indeed, wavered in the conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of 
conduct, and the end of life.  But I now thought that this end was only to be attained 
by not making it the direct end.  Those only are happy (I thought) who have their 
minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of 
others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as 
a means, but as itself an ideal end.  Aiming thus at something else, they find 
happiness by the way.  The enjoyments of life (such was now my theory) are 
sufficient to make it a pleasant thing, when they are taken en passant, without being 
made a principle object.  Once make them so, and they are immediately felt to be 
insufficient.  They will not bear a scrutinizing examination.  Ask yourself whether 
you are happy, and you cease to be so.  The only chance is to treat, not happiness, but 
some end external to it, as the purpose of life.266 
 
This principle is “re-affirmed thirty years later in his Utilitarianism, where he [claims not only] 
that 'conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realising such happiness 
as is attainable’”, but also that happiness, being innately temporary, cannot be experienced in 
perpetuity, and that resilient individuals cultivate tranquility that transcends all pain (such is how 
Mill compensates for the inconstancy and difficulty of attaining happiness).267  The specific 
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wording of this passage from Autobiography, however, privileges readers with a simpler, fuller, 
more personal explanation of his original intent, thus enhancing Utilitarianism.   
Thus, according to Mill, though happiness is life’s direct end and therefore the first 
principle, personal happiness cannot be.  Rather, it must be found by the way; moreover, one 
must aim to make others’ happiness their ideal end.  In doing so, personal happiness is achieved.  
 This excerpt from Autobiography alone is enough to truly muddy the once clearer 
delineation between utilitarianism and Christianity.  Based on this passage, it could be argued 
that, to some degree, this method of finding happiness is similar to JPII’s resolve to treat 
happiness as something accidental or collateral, per his earlier critique of utilitarianism.268  In 
this way, contrary to expectation, it would appear that two moral doctrines on opposite ends of 
the moral spectrum – one a hedonistic and personalistic blend of utilitarianism, the other purely 
Christian – have more in common than was previously thought.  If that were not enough to 
confuse readers, however, JPII further muddies the distinction in his 2002 Papal welcoming 
address to those attending the 17th World Youth Day in Toronto, Ontario, Canada.  In seeming 
bold contrast to those core principles expressed in Love and Responsibility, JPII stating that 
People are made for happiness. Rightly, then, you thirst for happiness. Christ has 
the answer to this desire of yours. But he asks you to trust him. True joy is a 
victory, something which cannot be obtained without a long and difficult struggle. 
Christ holds the secret of this victory. … The joy promised by the Beatitudes is the 
very joy of Jesus himself: a joy sought and found in obedience to the Father and in 
the gift of self to others.269 
 
Here we encounter a paradox.  Based on everything that has already been stated of JPII’s 
philosophy, the opening sentence of this quotation, that “[p]eople are made for happiness”, 
appears to be a bald-face departure from Love and Responsibility.  How can a Christian of JPII’s 
persuasion say that people are “made for happiness”, that they “[r]ightly… thirst for happiness”, 
and yet, not subscribe to the utilitarian mentality?  Furthermore, how can such a person 
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knowingly critique utilitarianism without qualifying as exceedingly hypocritical?  Do not these 
two philosophers share the same view on life’s ideal end, views only to be distinguished by use 
of different terminology?  If so, what then is the fundamental difference between Christianity 
and utilitarianism?  Are they not aligned in their purpose?  Both doctrines advocate for care of 
others above care for oneself in one way or another – there is, therefore, clear overlap in these 
principles.  Is Mill correct in asserting that, at the root of every moral doctrine, all people and all 
actions are both accountable and oriented toward Happiness theory? 
To keenly delineate between each philosophy, we must first examine their core 
similarities.  Both Mill and JPII believe that humans are ‘created’ for happiness, and that 
happiness must not be one’s primary life objective.  Mill asserts that happiness must be achieved 
by the way, whereas JPII asserts that it must be treated as something “accidental or collateral”; 
though it cannot be stated with certainty that these statements are synonyms, they appear close in 
their meaning.  Each philosopher also acknowledges that service of someone or something other 
than oneself is what will (ultimately) cause or lead to happiness and or lasting fulfilment.270 
Closer analysis of this expert from Autobiography provides clearer evidence of the 
differences existing between each philosophy.  For Mill, the focus is on others’ happiness as the 
ideal end in itself.  Though it be not the goal of the action, a biproduct of focusing on the ‘good’ 
of others is that one will find themselves happy, or that they will come by happiness at some 
point as a direct result of their actions.  For Mill, this type of action would constitute a purely 
benevolent, disinterested selflessness – thus, according to Autobiography (and, at 
Utilitarianism’s core), a simplified iteration of Mill’s altered version of this principle would be, 
“Do not treat others as a means to your own happy end by making others happy so that you 
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might also become happy – rather, ensure their happiness regardless of good feeling you will 
eventually feel by helping them.” 
The issue for JPII is that, for Mill, others’ happiness is the ideal end, rather than people 
(those experiencing happiness) being ideal ends in and of themselves.  Thus, Mill’s ideal end is 
an experience and feeling rather than the human person, as in JPII’s case.  One must therefore 
reiterate Utilitarianism’s core principle – that all things are accountable to emotions and feelings 
experienced from within.  In contrast, for JPII, in the case of human interaction, and per the 
(Second) Commandment to Love all are accountable to concrete, rational matter, the human 
person, who possesses the power of self-determination in and through their God-imaging dignity.   
This brings us to a full examination of this excerpt from JPII’s World Youth Day address, 
which is still not fully reconciled to this core principle of Love and Responsibility.  Perhaps the 
first two sentences of this quotation – that “[p]eople are made for happiness. Rightly, then, you 
thirst for happiness” – more than any other, explain why JPII begins his critique of utilitarianism 
by stating that “utilitarianism is a characteristic property of contemporary man’s mentality and 
his attitude toward life. … utilitarianism constitutes a perennial bedrock, as it were, on which the 
life of individuals and human collectives tends to flow”.271  The thirst, the desire, the pang to 
achieve happiness, is perfectly natural, perfectly human.  But, as the core of Love and 
Responsibility attests, the ideal end is the person, not the feeling.  For Christians, the ultimate 
end, desire, and thirst of each is the person of Christ – “Christ has the answer to this desire of 
yours”.272  One may rejoinder – does this mean that Christ is happiness?  Yet this question comes 
too soon, for, JPII follows with “But he asks you to trust him.”273 
Trust?  Why?  For what reason? 
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In accordance with the spirit of Love and Responsibility’s ethics, this trust is a trust that 
outlasts all feeling.  It remains strong during both good times and in bad, in sickness and in 
health, all the days of one’s life, regardless of pleasure, pain, happiness, unhappiness, utility 
gained, utility lost.  Moreover, it seeks the person, not the feeling of a good time, or good times 
past.  While it is true that, according to biblical teaching, the very same teachings from which 
JPII’s philosophy springs, Christ invites his followers to “unload all [their] burden [suffering] on 
to him, since he is concerned about [them]”, it is critical to know that although this process of 
unloading is freeing, it can also be painful.274  Thus, union with Christ will not always mean 
immediate gratification, immediate happiness, immediate rapture – as JPII states, “[t]rue joy is a 
victory, something which cannot be obtained without a long and difficult struggle.”275   
For at the core of Christian teaching is Christ’s invitation, a request for his followers to 
take up their own crosses, their pain, their suffering and walk with him along the road to death 
and resurrection: “Then Jesus said to his disciples, ‘If anyone wants to be a follower of mine, let 
him renounce himself and take up his cross and follow me.  Anyone who wants to save his life 
will lose it; but anyone who loses his life for my sake will find it.”276  In accordance with Love 
and Responsibility, this translates to “Those who forgo pleasure and pain’s mitigation in the 
interest of upholding others’ dignity will save their life”, or, “Those who forgo pleasure and 
pain’s mitigation by allowing those with whom they are in relationship to determine their own 
end, and by striving toward honourable ends with them, will save their eternal life.” 
This also is the core of Christian prayer, an echoing of the words of Christ in the Garden 
– “Not my will, but your will be done, Father”, for as in the case of Jesus’ crucifixion, the object 
was not to feel the least amount of pain, rather, to do the Father’s will, which required him to 
endure much suffering for the sake of the people whom he loves.  Moreover, according to his 
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own testament, Christ’s sacrifice was done not merely to bring a temporary, non-transsubjective, 
-suprasubjective earthly happiness to those who follow the Word, but to bring all people “[t]rue 
[eternal] joy” regardless of their virtues, vices, and former sins: “Christ holds the secret of this 
victory. … The joy promised by the Beatitudes is the very joy of Jesus himself: a joy sought and 
found in obedience to the Father and in the gift of self to others”, even in the face of poverty, 
sadness, meekness, hunger, persecution for righteousness, choosing forgiveness over resentment, 
purity over impulse, peace over violence, self-sacrificial death to oneself.277  This leads to eternal 
joy – through death, emptying oneself, self-gift, the pain of failing, falling, and rising to continue 
on the journey toward the person, just as Christ does for all of humanity in laying down his life, 
to new life in Christ’s resurrection.  Therefore, by excising pain and suffering in the way that 
Mill advocates, so too is the Cross is excised, and thus the resurrection – that is, eternal joy – for 
one does not exist without the other. 
In this way, for JPII, happiness is not equal to or synonymous with joy either.  Rather, 
true joy is born of suffering for love, and “since Revelation tells us that ‘God is love’”, love is a 
person.278  Therefore, according to Christian teaching, God is not happiness, and happiness is not 
equal to love, for love is not a feeling.  Love is a choice to self-sacrifice, and self-sacrifice 
(Love), is Word made flesh in the human person of Jesus Christ.  Therefore, self-sacrifice is 
itself a human person, Jesus.  For if God is love, and love is the act of self-sacrifice, then Jesus is 
action, self-sacrifice, personified.  Word – self-sacrifice – made flesh, life-giving action itself, 
the sacrificial lamb, bread of life, broken to take away the sins of the world, and to unite the 
world in eternally.279  As Christians attest, he is eternal, he is not temporary, and unlike 
happiness, he is not experienced in isolation (for as JPII asserts, happiness is not suprasubjective 
or transsubjective).  He is experienced in a communion of persons, in relationship.   
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In the same way that JPII states that “[t]wo-sided love [love that reciprocates and creates 
community] creates the most proximate basis for two ‘I’s’ to become one ‘we’”, it might also be 
stated that because Love and God are synonymous, it could be said that to love someone is to 
God them – thus “I love you” is synonymous with “I God you”.280  In this very sentence, we see 
JPII’s principle keenly demonstrated, for with God, a relationship-oriented entity, the ‘I’ and the 
‘you’ are united.  Therefore, while happiness is a personal experience, Love (God), unites, 
upholds the dignity of the person, puts them before pleasure, even to the point of giving up his 
only son.281  Moreover, as Christianity teaching, humans are an extension of God, all have their 
end in God – therefore, humanity is an extension of Love, “made in His image” and are therefore 
“very good”.282  In this way, it is in humanity’s very nature to God, to Love, to self-sacrifice, to 
make a gift of ourselves, and in imaging him, we find our full and true purpose.283   
 Here we approach a key reason why JPII sees marriage and family as the core of society.  
As expressed in many of JPII’s other teachings, just as Christ’s love for humanity is so strong 
that he lays down his life so that all may find new life in him, so too is the love between a man 
and a woman in marriage.  For in dying to their personal concerns, in committing to each other in 
love, for life, and under all circumstance, and in striving toward honourable ends and the 
strengthening of their relationship, the new life of a child in the one flesh communion of persons 
issues forth – “Spousal love … consists in giving one’s own person.  The essence of spousal love 
is giving oneself, giving one’s ‘I’.”284  In this way, the end for which they strive is not only 
communion with each other as human persons, but also new life, another human person, 
children, who strengthens their marital bond.  Christian scholar Christopher West echoes these 
same Wojtyłian sentiments in his own Eclipse of the Body, where he states: 
Scripture uses many images to help us understand God’s love. …But, as John Paul 
II wrote, the gift of Christ’s body on the cross gives “definitive prominence to the 
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spousal meaning of God’s love.’  … Indeed, we can summarize all of Sacred 
Scripture with five simple yet astounding words: God wants to marry us.  “For as a 
young man marries a virgin, your Builder shall marry you; And as a bridegroom 
rejoices in his bride so shall your God rejoice in you (Isa 62:5 NABRE).285 
 
In essence, Christ commits the ultimate act of spousal love by dying so that he might marry 
humanity.  Therefore, just as humans are made in the image of God, so too is marriage an 
image of God’s love for humanity.  West further affirms this principle of JPII’s teachings 
on marriage, family, and society when he states that just as Christ dies on the cross to give 
eternal life and peace to all of human society, so too does the proper function of marriage 
and the family cultivate greater peace in the world:  
[S]ince the family is the fundamental cell of society, if an “era of peace” is to be 
granted to the world, that peace can only come if there is peace in the marital 
relationship … in the womb … in the family.  And this will only happen if we are 
reconciled to the truth of our own greatness as men and women who bear in our 
bodies the sacramental sign of the divine plan – a plan that inevitably leads us to 
the nuptial mystery of the Cross.286 
 
In this way, West reaffirms JPII’s threefold, bible-based teaching; firstly, that God is Love; 
secondly, that Christ’s nuptial sacrifice on the Cross is imaged in man and woman, the family, 
marriage, in procreation, progeny, the strengthening of the spousal relationship; finally, that the 
ultimate gift which God gives to humanity is new, eternal life – not merely with him in an 
earthly, subjective form of happiness – but through, with, and in the Holy Trinity of persons, just 
as man finds the truth of who he is in the self-sacrificial communion of persons in marriage – 
“man, being an image of God, cannot find himself unless through a sincere gift of self in the 
communion of persons.”287   
This does not mean that marriage is a means to Christ, or that one’s spouse is a means to 
Christ – rather, each are ideal ends in themselves, and because humanity finds its end in Christ, 
man and woman are each other’s helpmates toward “beatific union with God.”288  For JPII’s 
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alteration of Kant’s moral imperative does not end with “Whenever the person is an object of 
action in your conduct, remember that you may not treat him merely as a means to an end, as a 
tool, but [you must] take into account that the person himself has or at least should have his end” 
– rather, it continues – “the relation to another man does not merely depend on the fact of him 
being an end in himself, but also on him being ordained to ends outside of himself that are 
perfective of him … and ultimately to God as his final end.”289 
Therefore, in accordance with JPII’s Christian philosophical foundation, while it is true 
that “[h]uman beings are made for happiness”, happiness is not the first principle of Christianity, 
and it cannot be the reason for which one acts.  Rather, loving others in the same self-sacrificial 
way that Christ loves his bride, the Church, to ensure an eternal communion of persons is, in 
truth, life’s purpose.  This is done without expectation of repayment, reciprocation, or instant 
gratification.  Instead, the reward lies in eternal joy in God, who is Love – a transsubjective, 
suprasubjective entity who unifies all.  In this way, Love – self-giving – powers happiness. 
In summary, Mill holds that happiness must be found by the way.  One’s direct end is not 
personal happiness.  Rather, it is to ensure others’ happiness, and in doing so, so too is one’s own 
happiness assured.  Similarly, JPII holds that people are both made and rightly thirst for 
happiness.  However, true happiness comes from self-sacrifice, forgoing concerns for one’s own 
experience of pleasure or pain to strengthen relationships, create new life, to allow others to 
determine their own ends, and to affirm others’ dignity.  The ideal end is the human person, not 
others’ happiness.  This principle is reflected in the way of the Cross; Christians are called to 
walk with Christ, to share in his pain and suffering, and in doing so, to participate in the 
resurrection, which leads to eternal union with the person of God.  Without, the cross there is no 
reunification with humanity’s ultimate ideal end, that is, the Creator.  In this way, for JPII, God 
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is Love, spousal love, an eternal act of self-gift imaged in marriage and family.  Society’s proper 
application of this Christian principle will result in greater social unification.   
This brings us to the topic of faith.  
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8: Impact of Mill’s Agnosticism and JPII’s Christianity 
Much of Part 7 discussed JPII’s Christian take on self-sacrificial love and on the human 
person’s eternal purpose.  The most important topic left improperly addressed in this entire 
discussion of the (Second) Commandment to Love is each philosopher’s view of Christ’s First 
Commandment.  As JPII states “it is worthwhile to recall the commandment to love in its full 
reading: ‘You shall love the Lord, your God, with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your 
strength, and with all your mind, and your neighbor as yourself’.”290  We now approach what a 
Christian would characterize as the unequivocally fundamental difference between each doctrine. 
Given the core ethics of Love and Responsibility, the fact that JPII was both Pope 
and canonized by the Catholic Church, his faith in Christ was clearly very strong.  Mill’s 
acceptance of Christian teaching was, however, much less clear.  Firstly, Mill was an 
agnostic.291  Secondly, as far as Utilitarianism goes, the question of God’s existence is left 
open to readers discretion, likely to enhance the doctrine’s universal appeal.292  Using a 
Christian approach to dissect Mill’s personal belief system as expressed in Utilitarianism, 
it is logical to assume that if Mill believed in God’s existence, he would have envisioned 
him as happiness itself or a means to happiness, for happiness, being both perfect and most 
moral, and God its “morally perfect” creator, would mean the existence of a profound 
connection between them.293  This, however, is not entirely so.  Mill biographer Jose Harris 
states: 
Like his father before him Mill found that the existence of evil made it logically 
impossible to envisage a divine being who was both ethically righteous and 
omnipotent; but unlike James Mill he was able to conceive of an 'ideal Perfect 
Being' of whose existence there was 'enough in the course of Nature (when once 




Summarizing, Mill held that although pain’s existence was proof that God was not all-good 
and omnipotent, this did not disprove his potential existence.  And yet, Mill’s exclusion of 
Christ’s First Commandment from his appropriation and reinterpretation of the Second 
Commandment clearly illustrates Mill’s admission that his iteration of the Commandment 
was “the nearest approach to [Christ’s] ideal”.295  To any Christian, this exclusion is not 
merely inexcusable but wholly nonsensical, for in accordance with JPII’s Christian beliefs, 
God and love are synonymous, rather than love and pleasure.  If God is excised from the 
Commandment to Love, so is love.  For God and love are one.  Love of neighbour 
therefore cannot be achieved without God.  Thus, to love one’s neighbour as oneself is to 
“God one’s neighbour as oneself.”  Thus, according to JPII’s Christian perspective, God, 
love, and the Second part of the Commandment to Love are inseparable.   
This paper’s most crucial division therefore manifests itself in a simple question – 
which philosophy holds the greater truth on all things eternal?  Mill’s agnostic-Christian-
utilitarian hybrid, or JPII’s Christian doctrine, which relies for its full force on Christ’s 
promises, and in belief in heaven? 
As both philosophers attest, the utilitarian mentality is foundational to human 
attitudes toward life and human interaction.  It would therefore make perfect sense for non-
believers to finish this paper consciously subscribing to the utilitarian doctrine.  Clearly, 
Mill does a throughout job of detailing humanity’s most basic instincts, how they impact 
human action, how these actions’ consequences affect society at large, and how actions can 
be molded to benefit society and oneself.  But for those who are Christian, the blend of 
agnosticism, Christian personalism, Christ’s Commandments, and utilitarian hedonism 
presents an insurmountable barrier to accepting Mill’s insight on life’s First Principle.  For 
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Mill, these ethical doctrines are easily synergized.  For JPII, such synergy results in a 
nonsensical, self-contradicting doctrine.  To understand the logic of each viewpoint, one 
must examine each philosopher’s personal theological views on God, his (potential) 
existence, the extent to which he ‘influences’ human life, and heaven. 
 We begin with Chapters 3 and 5 of Utilitarianism where Mill undermines notions 
of transcendental theory.  As outlined in Part 5, Mill uses more the Second Commandment 
as well as internal and external sanctions to prove utilitarianism’s necessity.  On external 
sanctions, these can be appropriated from any moral doctrine, as long as they align with 
Happiness Theory.  This includes belief in and love of God.  This statement demonstrates 
Mill’s potential belief that because God exists “outside the mind”, people can exist 
independent of God and or think without God’s influence.296   
As for internal sanctions, Mill wholly refutes Christian notions of conscience, like 
those which Ignatik references from JPII’s Person and Act.  Conscience, Ignatik states, is a 
natural, morally endowed sensibility, inclining humans toward the objective moral order: 
For conscience reveals essential truth about man as a person, and – according to the 
author – precisely the relation to truth belongs to the essence of freedom, and of 
conscience that binds freedom: “Freedom is due to the human person not as pure 
independence, but as self-dependence, which contains dependence on truth […] , 
and this is most vividly manifested in conscience […].  The proper and complete 
function of conscience consists in making the act depend on truth.”297 
 
While Christians hold that freedom of conscience properly exercised requires the influence 
objective (Christian) truth for a morally righteous outcome, Mill argues that conscience is a 
subjective, internal product of human experience, feeling, praise, abasement, ethics, and a 
desire to be liked, and that it is not an objective, external God-given sixth sense that orients 
humanity toward goodness.298  He further argues that abiding by this subjective feeling is 
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solely a choice, unprompted by supernatural grace; therefore, God can, if he so chooses, 
reveal his divine plan through utilitarianism, since he wants his creation’s happiness.299  
Mill further undermines transcendental theory by undermining the very notion of God.  
He states: some claim, that believers those who abide by ‘God’s’ external sanction are more 
likely to behave well or in the interest of others.300  But God is merely a concoction of the mind, 
a subjective feeling; indeed, the degree to which one believes is merely the measure of strength 
they possess to resist selfishness when feelings urge them to act otherwise.301  Furthermore, 
whether God and his sanctions concerning reward and punishment objectively exist outside the 
mind, the sole reason that humans know and live by them is because these sanctions exist inside 
their minds.302  Thus, the internal choice to adhere to these external sanctions depends on the 
degree to which one believes in social Duty, for God’s existence is questionable.303  
To further destabilize notions that ‘God’s’ divine influence on conscience strengthens a 
Christian’s’ resolve to live selflessly, Mill reminds readers that it is possible to refute one’s 
conscience’s advice.304  For those refuting believers, objective morality exists only insofar as it is 
convenient to regard it.305  The argument that one’s conscience’s immovable nature proves God 
exists outside the mind is, therefore, an inherently flawed argument.306  Furthermore, those who, 
with much difficulty, remain obedient to their conscience merely do so because of external 
sanctions, not transcendental theory.307  In sum, belief in God’s grace and conscience’s 
corruptibility no more predispose a person toward moral goodness than does belief in Duty; 
though utilitarianism may have its share of morally weak followers, so to do all other 
doctrines.308  In truth, adherence to external sanctions is a free choice made internally.  
Furthermore, God, a mere figment of feeling, experience and imagination, and a misguided, 
dated explanation for one’s internal sense of Duty, cannot be proven based on a person’s 
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inconstant adherence to God’s apparent will, as expressed by their ‘conscience’.  Therefore, 
‘God’ and Duty have equal impact on human action.   Believers therefore have no more access to 
a subjective feeling of social Duty than do non-believers; therefore, each are equally capable of 
committing morally righteous acts. 
In undermining notions of God and conscience’s objective existence, as well as their 
ability to positively impact a person’s behaviour, Mill asserts utilitarianism’s supremely selfless 
nature.  He states: a utilitarian need not fear God nor punishment, nor selfish desires to be 
rewarded by God, to urge them to act in the interest of others, for the truest utilitarian does not 
use fear of God to discourage them from acting selfishly or expeditiously.309  They simply act 
well out of a strong sense of Duty.310  In this way, Mill upholds utilitarianism as the most honest, 
selfless, self-sufficient doctrine, needless of both God and an apparent inborn sense of moral 
rightness to function effectively. 
Mill continues to undermine transcendental theory in Chapter 5 of Utilitarianism.  
While concluding that justice is the most crucial facet of social utility, Mill offers two 
additional conclusions about social justice that run contrary to Christian understanding of 
the Commandment to Love.311  Firstly, to fulfill the dictates of justice, one must except 
reciprocal repayment for one’s deeds – evil for evil, good for good.312  Secondly, there 
exist those things which one must do out of social Duty, and those things that one should 
do above the standard or minimum.313  Punishment, reserved for those failing to fulfill their 
moral obligation, must always suit the crime; this requirement must be tempered, however, 
for it is no (moral) crime to refrain from generosity or beneficence.314 Confusing virtue 
with justice in this way would result in a social tyranny which forces people to work 
tirelessly to repay unrepayable debts.315 
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In the spirit of reading the Second Commandment according to its full and original, 
Christian intent, one must note that Mill pairs Old Testament dictates of punishment with 
New Testament dictates of mercy and love.  As Mill states, the law of “an eye for an eye 
and a tooth for a tooth” (lex talionis) is born from Jewish, Mahomedan, (and therefore 
Christian law); this mentality toward justice, however, runs contrary to New Testament 
ethics.316  For at the heart of John 3:16 is that Jesus comes into the world to fulfill the Old 
Testament law, to carry the weight of sin and punishment on his back, to forgive humanity 
and dying for the sake of all persons – past, present, and future.317  In doing so, he takes 
away all need for retribution.  Christians believe that his sacrifice grants mercy in its fullest 
and richest extent by repaying all human evil with his ultimate good.  In accordance with 
JPII’s Gospel-based ethics, the love of Christ transcends all humanity’s virtue, all vice, and 
all the good things done in honour of him.318  His sacrifice is was made so that all believers 
might participate in new life, true joy, through the way of the Cross.319    
In sum, Mill views the Old Testament maxim “An eye for an eye”, and the New 
Testament maxims “Love your neighbour” and “Treat others…” as compatible.   JPII, in 
accord with Christianity, holds Old Testament law fulfilled by Christ, and New Testament 
law in current effect.  In the Christian view, it is therefore humanity’s duty to image 
Christ’s sacrifice, and to show mercy to one’s fellow man.  Such are these core differences 
between each philosophy made manifest in their respective beliefs on God, heaven, Jesus, 
on Jesus’ sacrifices and on their impact on conscience, justice, mercy, and love. 
Those Christian notions of justice and freedom which Mill does not synergize with 
utilitarian teaching provide keener delineation between Mill’s iteration of the Commandment to 
Love and JPII’s.  To begin, JPII argues that just because people seek pleasure or pain’s 
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mitigation does not automatically morally legitimate their pursuit.  From this, JPII offers his 
improved version of Kant’s “elementary principle of the moral order”; the original, “‘Act in such 
a way so that the person is never a mere means of your action, but always an end’”, is revised to 
“Whenever the person is an object of action in your conduct, remember that you may 
not treat him merely as a means to an end, as a tool, but [you must] take into account 
that the person himself has or at least should have his end.”  This principle thus 
formulated stands at the basis of every properly comprehended freedom of man, 
especially freedom of conscience.320 
 
This quotation reveals that both Mill and JPII envision human freedom differently.  For 
JPII, though humanity is free to make both loving and unloving choices, unloving choices, 
specifically toward others, constitute a misuse of the true purpose of freedom, which 
contrary to the utilitarian’s aim to acquire happiness, results in the doers “emptiness and 
unfulfillment.”321  Therefore, according to JPII, the freedom to choose our own end and 
ends as human beings does not make us free from accountability to God or to our fellow 
man.  As established in Part 3 of this paper, in human relationships, freedom’s true purpose 
is to protect others’ innate dignity and to refrain from using others as mere instruments of 
utility.  As Ignatik notes in Love and Responsibility’s “Translator’s Forward”, “[b]eing 
created in and for love[, that is, self-sacrificial action that prioritizes and affirms others’ 
dignity], man in his freedom is unintelligible without love.”322 
To be just, then, is to “give every man what is rightly due to him”.323  As JPII states: “It is 
rightly due to the person to be treated as an object of love, and not as an object of use … 
[therefore] love is a requirement of justice, just as the use of a person as a means would be 
contrary to this justice”.324  Viewing a person as a mere tool is contrary to his very nature, 
fulfillment, and purpose; furthermore, it obstructs his dignity and ability to choose his own 
end.325  In this way, JPII holds that justice envelops love, “[f]or certainly to love man or God, to 
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love a person, is something just” and honourable; conversely, because love is directed toward 
persons, and justice toward things that are owed to the person, JPII asserts that love supersedes 
justice, or at least becomes separate from it.326  Therefore, love requires honourableness, and 
honourableness requires pleasure’s subordination; additionally, though loving a person is just, 
mere justice does not constitute love.327  Contrary to Mill, JPII holds that justice, the highest 
form of utility, cannot therefore constitute the most important facet of the moral order.328 
JPII continues this discussion, asserting that love and justice must be applied to sexual 
ethics, for it is just to treat a person as a person – not as an object for pleasurable use.329  To 
reduce sexual love to mere “sensuality and affectivity” (a conscious and subconscious effort on 
the actor’s part), normalizes love’s distortion – thus, a pleasurable experience becomes pursuing 
pleasure, pursing pleasure alone, and subordinating all things to pleasure.330  The (hedonistic) 
utilitarian norm supports use of the person – therefore, it is at odds with the personalistic norm, 
justice, the Commandment to Love “God and neighbours”, and therefore with Christianity.331 
The next critical addition to JPII’s ethics is that man, in his freedom, is accountable to 
God.  This topic, fully addressed in “Chapter IV: Justice with Respect to the Creator” of Love 
and Responsibility, is briefly referenced in Chapter I, Part One where he states that his revised 
version of Kant’s moral imperative “stands at the basis of every properly comprehended freedom 
of man”.332  Adding to JPII’s revised edition of Kant’s principle, Ignatik adds that man is not 
only an end in himself – he is “ordained to ends outside of himself that are perfective of him (and 
of his freedom), and ultimately to God as his final end”.333  In this way, man, in his dignity, is “a 
creature called to the beatific union with God”, for as Christ states: “Whoever remains in me and 
I in him will bear much fruit, because without me you can do nothing.”334   
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Here, an important parallelism is established, for in the same way that the dignity of the 
person is constant, so too is God constant, never-changing, ever dependable, ever independent.  
Therefore, man, being made in God’s image, wholly incapable of doing and being without him, 
is made for God, and is accountable to God; logically therefore, man must order his own end 
toward God – God, however, will not force him to do so.335  As JPII states: “man [is] the only 
being that is willed by God for its own sake” and therefore has the freedom to reject his 
maker.336  In this way, God does not create humanity as a means to his own happiness, rather, 
God creates humanity out of a love that extends to all people regardless of whether they requite 
him.337  Because humans are free to requite God, they cannot become Love’s means to an end, 
for love and use are opposed.338  The human person must therefore choose to enter an eternal 
relationship with God of their own free will, for “God does not save man against his will.”339 
Therefore, Mill teaches that freedom is for the sake of individual and societal attainment 
of subjective happiness and subjective mitigation of pain, that man does not possess an 
accountability to God, and that lex talionis properly ordered toward society’s good, is the most 
important facet of social utility.  In contrast, JPII teaches that freedom used justly demonstrates 
respect for the Creator and seeks to find its natural end in him; in addition, justice’s importance 
does not supersede that of Love’s, for all creation is accountable to Love, justice’s source. 
With this, we approach the final delineation between Mill and JPII’s respective iterations 
of the Commandment to Love, as manifest in their views on eternal life and the temporary nature 
of happiness.  As discussed in Part 3, Mill argues that happiness is both temporary and 
unsustainable, for a life in constant “rapture” is impossible.340  A life void of most pain and filled 
with much happiness, however, is both possible, the happiest anyone could ever expect to be 
(were it not for “[t]he present wretched education and … social arrangements”), and a life 
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“worthy of the name of happiness”.341  In sum, one can never realistically expect to experience 
continual happiness – happiness (pleasure) is innately temporary.342  Happiness, love, goodness, 
pleasure, utility, and so forth, does not range beyond earthly limits.  
As an agnostic, the possibility of life beyond earth is, for Mill, either unlikely or 
fallacious.  Human beings, being mortal, could never fully hope to experience eternal, continual 
happiness.  In this way, according to Mill’s personal religious views, even the supposed noble 
sacrifice of ‘hero’ and martyr Jesus Christ for the sake of others’ “eternal happiness” would 
likely constitute a virtuous sacrifice better left undone – this because the sacrifice is unconnected 
to an attainable form of happiness, and such sacrifices are never “[themselves] a good”.343   
Therefore, in accordance with Mill’s agnostic-utilitarian views, it is likely that a person 
will have lost nothing by orienting their earthly happiness toward their own satisfaction, or 
toward society’s satisfaction merely for the sake of their own safety and security, this because 
their exist no eternal consequences for what JPII terms “egoistic” behaviour.344  To live any other 
way would be a wasted opportunity to achieve maximum pleasure and to minimize life’s pain.  
In Christian terms, therefore, orienting one’s earthly life toward one’s own happiness (toward 
saving one’s own life), would not result in losing one’s (eternal) life and happiness.  It is 
therefore better to accept the human inclination toward pleasure and pain’s mitigation and to live 
in accordance with Happiness Theory than to place hope in the unfounded reality of heaven. 
JPII also holds that earthly pleasure is temporary by nature.  As a Christian, however, he 
would certainly have believed in heaven.  In this way, the (Second) Commandment to Love is 
superseded by the First, which JPII adamantly acknowledges: one must believe in and love the 
Lord God with all their heart and soul, not because of the riches he offers, but because he is both 
good and deserving of love, simply because he is Love, and because humans are created in 
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Love’s image.345  With this said, and, in contrast to Mill’s teaching, the truth of JPII’s philosophy 
is that humanity is destined for eternal greatness.  Humans can expect to gain eternal happiness 
beyond that which is experienced on earth.  One must therefore focus on storing up treasures in 
heaven, as opposed to one earth. 346  That said, happiness itself must not be humanity’s ultimate 
goal – rather, the goal must be to love God in and of himself, lest God become a mere means to 
the greatest pleasure and the mitigation of hell, the greatest pain.  Instead, this truly permanent 
mitigation of all pain, and permanent experience of all that is truly good, truly moral, truly 
pleasurable, and truly joyful, becomes a biproduct of eternal union. 
In summary, each philosopher holds opposing views on God’s, heaven’s, and hell’s 
existence, and on the effects of Jesus’ sacrifice on the Cross.  These core differences are made 
manifest in their varied treatment of the First and Second Commandments, and in their views on 
God, Duty, conscience, human freedom, justice, and the innately temporary nature of happiness. 
For Mill, external sanctions can be appropriated from any moral doctrine, including 
reverence for God.  ‘Conscience’s’ internal sanctions are mere products of one’s internal sense 
of Duty, and, of mere subjective human experience, feeling, and so forth.  Conscience’s 
corruptibility and belief in God’s grace no more predisposes one toward moral goodness than 
does belief in Duty, for adherence to external sanctions is a free choice made internally.  In this 
way, Mill holds that believers have no more access to this subjective feeling of social Duty than 
do non-believers and that all are capable of behaving just as morally as God-fearing individuals. 
Mill further argues that human freedom must be protected so that all people can attain 
their subjective happiness and subjective means of mitigating pain, without harming others.  Mill 
also holds that justice is the most important facet of social utility, and that one facet of its proper 
application requires enforcement of the Old Testament principle, “an eye for an eye and a tooth 
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for a tooth”.  Lastly, regarding happiness, Mill holds its nature innately temporary, thus revealing 
his implicit, agnostic stance that one can only expect to obtain earthly happiness. 
For JPII, conscience is not subjective – rather, it is supernaturally endowed with morally 
righteous sensibility; compliance with it affects positive social change.  Additionally, human 
freedom properly exercised requires that others’ dignity is prioritized above both personal and 
extra-personal concerns for happiness or pain’s mitigation.  Man must recall that, in being an 
image of God the Creator, each also have their end in him, and are therefore accountable to him.  
Lastly, justice does not supersede Love’s importance, for all creation is accountable to the Love 
that honours the human person beyond virtue, vice, good deeds, and sinful deeds.   
In this way, JPII’s implicit argument is that mercy precedes justice, for in preaching the 
Commandment to Love, Jesus aimed to unify all people in eternal life with him.  Therefore, 
though JPII and Mill agree that earthly happiness is innately temporary, JPII also believes in the 
reality of eternal nuptial union with God through the way of the Cross.  To achieve this 
everlasting communion, a human person must freely choose to requite God’s love.  Thus, the 
heart of Love and Responsibility – that humanity must love each other as Christ loves, as the 
Commandment to Love fully intends in accounting for God’s existence.  God and love are 
synonymous.  To love one’s neighbour is to “God one’s neighbour”, therefore, God is 
inseparable from the Commandment to Love.  The Second Commandment cannot exist or occur 
without the First.  Such love leads to the heart’s fulfilment, that is, new life in Christ.  
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9: Conclusion 
By closely examining and comparing Mill’s Utilitarianism to JPII’s Love and 
Responsibility, “Chapter I: The Person and the Drive: Part One: Analysis of the Verb ‘to use’”, 
we can conclude that, for Mill, all things are subject to happiness and to pain’s mitigation – that 
is, to feeling a certain way.  The best way of achieving personal happiness is to make others’ 
happiness one’s ideal end.  For JPII, all things are subject to love, an act of self-giving made 
between two human persons to affirm the innate, God-given dignity of the other – thus, the end 
of all human interaction must be the human person.  This end cannot truly be achieved without 
first honouring God, a directive which Jesus deems the First Commandment.  While both 
philosophers see the value of pleasure, of utility, of happiness, and the unavoidable factor of use 
existing in (married) love, their philosophies are irrevocably demarcated by differing 
interpretations of the Commandment to Love.  Each philosopher argues that their philosophy will 
lead to greater social harmony, which for JPII, and arguably for Mill also, means greater 
harmony within marriages and families.  
Part 2 has offered five conclusions.  Firstly, despite differences in era and in discipline, 
each philosopher defines utilitarianism in the same way; furthermore, each agree that human 
beings are inclined toward the utilitarian mentality.  Secondly, JPII’s critique of utilitarianism 
applies to hedonistic utilitarianism and to the incongruous nature of hedonistic and personalistic 
utilitarianism, which Mill champions.  Thirdly, while Mill holds that all action and therefore all 
morality is oriented toward the Greatest Happiness Principle, JPII holds that in human 
relationships, all are called to subordinate a desire for pleasure and pain’s mitigation to the 
protection of each person’s inalienable dignity.347  From this conclusion, one can assert that, 
fourthly, each philosopher conceives of the mind’s limits differently – for Mill, people cannot 
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think beyond a basic desire for pleasure and pain’s mitigation; for JPII, the mind is capable of 
prioritizing human dignity over these concerns. 
Fifthly, both Mill and JPII hold that humans are geared toward social communion.  While 
Mill explains what people should do with this inclination, JPII explains the source from which 
this inclination stems (God), and, in accounting for it, how humans should respond.  Sixth and 
finally, Mill strongly rebukes the moral elasticity of Kant’s first principle, as expressed in his 
Metaphysics of Ethics; conversely, JPII strongly values the moral rightness of Kant’s elementary 
principle, as expressed in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.  Each use their 
different interpretations of Kant’s primary principle to justify their philosophies.  
Parts 3 and 5 examined each philosopher’s views on pleasure, utility, human dignity, and 
the Commandment to Love.  On the one hand, Mill equates love with pleasure.  Therefore, the 
Commandment to Love becomes the Commandment to Pleasure.  To achieve an Edenic society, 
the greatest pleasure and least pain must be assured for the greatest number.  In marriage, and in 
marital intimacy, the focus is to maximize personal pleasure by maximizing one’s spouse’s 
pleasure.  Selfless acts are fundamentally motivated by fear of being harmed or caused pain 
(particularly for those who cannot bring themselves to become what Mill terms as benevolent 
utilitarians).  Conversely, JPII holds that love and pleasure are separate entities.  For JPII and the 
Church, the Commandment to Love is the Commandment to Self-Sacrifice.  To achieve an 
Edenic society, one must focus on affirming the innate dignity and worth of each human person.  
This experience may involve a great amount of pleasure and or pain for the doer and the receiver 
of the (potential) action.  In marriage, therefore, specifically in marital intimacy, the focus is to 
affirm one’s spouse’s dignity and worth by focusing on the person rather than pleasure or pain’s 
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mitigation.  Truly selfless acts are fundamentally motivated by a desire to serve and sacrifice for 
others, and to honour God by honouring others’ innate, God-imaging dignity. 
Part 4 notes the objective and subjective ways that each philosopher characterizes their 
moral order.  On the one hand, Mill offers an objective moral order rooted in the subjective 
standard of personal happiness.  What a person is inclined toward achieving, that is, pleasure and 
freedom from pain, determines who the human person is and what the moral standard is, which 
in turn determines what a human person should do.  On the other hand, JPII offers an objective 
moral order rooted in greater objectivity, asserting that human beings are unique, unrepeatable, 
distinct, rational entities, possessing free will, and endowed with self-determination.  Therefore, 
who a human person is defines what they should do and how they should interact with others.  
Mill considers the objective-subjective nature of his philosophy to be a strength, for subjective 
standards safeguard personal liberty.  JPII considers the objective-objective nature of his 
philosophy to be a strength, for it safeguards the innate and equal dignity of all.  While Mill 
believes that objective-objective (or ‘constant’) standards, general propositions and axiomatic 
truths, lead to false conclusions and society’s disintegration, JPII believes that objective-
subjective (or ‘inconstant’) standards based in personal tastes for pleasure and pain are corrupted 
by fallen human nature, and therefore lead to false conceptions of reality that, incidentally, cause 
harm to the human person. 
Part 6 examined the basic mathematical and economic principles undergirding each 
philosopher’s view of the Commandment and pleasure.  The constant value in Mill’s equation is 
‘experience’ – that is, an experience of pleasure or of pain – granted, no two experiences are 
alike.  Therefore, Mill’s ‘constant’ is, by nature, inconstant.  On the other hand, the constant 
value in JPII’s ‘equation’ is the innate dignity of the human person, which is not situationally 
102 
dependent or subject to change, but ever-present.  Therefore, JPII’s constant value is, by nature, 
constant.  Despite the usual positive connotations associated with constancy, and despite the 
usual negative connotations associated with inconstancy, each philosopher views their constant 
value as a strength, a positive life-force, in their philosophical ‘equation’. 
Furthermore, Mill champions addition, that is, adding to personal pleasures by giving of 
one’s life to ensure others’ happiness, which leads to personal fulfillment.  On the other hand, 
JPII’s focus is subtraction – giving of oneself, losing one’s life, not because it is pleasurable, but 
because others should have their dignity affirmed regardless of the pleasure or pain involved, 
which, collaterally speaking, leads to personal fulfillment.  Despite the usual positive 
connotations associated with addition and the usual negative connotations associated with 
subtraction, each philosopher considers their respective ‘systems’ to be the strength of their 
philosophical ‘equation’. 
Part 7 provided extra-textual insight on Mill and JPII’s core principles to address seeming 
contradictions in their philosophies.  As Mill’s Autobiography attests, happiness must be found 
by the way, and that making others’ happiness one’s ideal end as opposed to one’s own will, 
ironically, result in one’s own happiness.  The Mill-utilitarian’s goal, therefore, is not personal 
happiness – rather, it is to ensure others’ happiness, and in doing so, so too is one’s own 
happiness assured.  As JPII’s 2002 Papal address at World Youth Day attests, people are both 
created for and righteously desire happiness – however, true happiness comes from suffering for 
others’ sake.  Forgoing concerns for personal pleasure and pain’s mitigation so as to strengthen 
relationships, create new life, allow others to determine their own ends, and to affirm another’s 
dignity, must be the goal in human relationships.  Therefore, the ideal end of human interaction 
must be the human person as opposed to their happiness.  This principle is reflected in Christ’s 
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passion, death, and resurrection, which leads to eternal union with the person of God, humanity’s 
ultimate end.  In this way, for JPII, God is Love, spousal love, an eternal act of self-gift imaged 
in marriage and family.  Emulating Christ’s journey creates the possibility of greater peace and 
social unification. 
Finally, Part 8 examined each philosopher’s views on God, conscience, freedom, and 
justice.  The argument – that the degree to which one values or believes in one philosophy over 
another is dependent upon one’s belief in the existence of the Christian God.  On the one hand, 
Mill seeks to achieve an Earthy paradise.  His agnostic views make him skeptical of God’s 
existence and of a heavenly reality.  He believes it possible to appropriate religious values, to 
apply them effectively, without ‘God’ and ‘grace’, each of which, to Christians, are required for 
a truly deep and effective application of the Commandment.  On the other hand, JPII seeks to 
achieve a heavenly paradise, because he is sure of God’s existence, and of heaven’s existence.  
This is why he would choose to forgo the utilitarian mentality of prioritizing pleasure so as to 
achieve eternal union with God.  JPII’s moral order is therefore founded in the Christ’s First 
Commandment, which the (Second) Commandment to Love expresses when full contextualized.  
At the heart of his argument is that God and love are synonymous.  To love one’s neighbour is to 
“God one’s neighbour”, therefore, God is inseparable from the Commandment to Love. The 
Second Commandment cannot exist or occur without the First. 
In reading this paper, the author hopes that the reader has come to a greater understanding 
of utilitarianism and Christianity, two doctrines fundamental to Western thought.  All that 
remains are two questions: to which definition of love do you currently subscribe – the Mill-
utilitarian’s definition, or the Wojtyłian definition?  In being informed of your current mindset, 
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